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TURNING ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION ON ITS E.A.R.:





S INCE 1993, many states have considered and enacted legislation
to encourage the regulated community to perform environmen-
tal audits.' The statutes take two forms: statutes providing a limited
privilege to environmental audit reports, and those granting immu-
nity from prosecution for violations discovered in an environmental
audit and voluntarily reported to authorities. Immunity affects the
state's right to collect civil or criminal penalties. On the other
hand, the privilege to environmental reports has the potential ad-
verse impact of shifting the burden of promoting environmental
compliance to the private plaintiff, rather than to the public treas-
ury. In determining the best approach for promoting environmen-
tal auditing and self-correction, state legislatures should consider
t LL.M., George Washington University, National Law Center (1996); J.D.,
Southern Methodist University (1989); B.A., The University of Texas at Austin
(1984).
1. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-301 to 8-1-312 (Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-25-126.5 (Supp. 1996) and § 25-1-114.5 (1989 & Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 9-
801 to 9-811, § 9-340 (Supp. 1996); 415 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/52.2 (West
Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4 (West Supp. 1996); KA. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3332 to 3339 (Supp. 1995); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040 (Michie 1995 & Supp.
1996); 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 132 (to be codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 324.14801-809 (1996)): 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168 (West); MIss. CODE ANN.
§§ 17-17-29(7) (g), 49-2-51, 49-17-43 and 49-17-427 (1995 & Supp. 1996); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 147-E (Supp. 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 468.963 (Supp. 1996); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws §§ 1-40-33 to 1-40-37 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc (West Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7-101 to 19-7-109
(1996) and UTAH R. EVID. 508; VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-11.2 (Michie Supp. 1996);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-11-1105 to 35-11-1106 (Michie Supp. 1996). Throughout
this Article session laws will be cited as they will be codified, where applicable.
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the following question: who ought to bear the cost of promoting
environmental audits, the public at large or the private litigant?
Most of the debate surrounding the environmental audit privi-
lege centers on enforcement actions, particularly prosecutions of
self-reported environmental violations. Little debate has focused
on how the statutes will affect private litigants. Therefore, state leg-
islatures that have recently passed environmental audit bills may
not have fully considered the potential adverse impacts on the pri-
vate litigant.
Several audit privilege and immunity statutes go beyond limit-
ing the government's right to discover and use environmental audit
documents in prosecution. Some of these statutes will have far-
reaching effects on the rights of private parties, including those in-
jured by environmental violations. For example, some of the privi-
lege statutes potentially threaten the ability of individuals harmed
by hazardous chemical releases to obtain vital information about
those same releases. Plaintiffs in toxic tort law-suits, whose health
and property values may have been damaged, face increased diffi-
culties in proving their cases. The immunity statutes could prevent
the punitive damages awards in some toxic tort suits; and even may,
depending on their scope, halt citizen suit enforcement. Finally,
businesses that have suffered economic disadvantages because of a
competitor's noncompliance may not be able to prove their case.
This Article discusses the potential impact on private litigants
of statutes providing privileges to environmental audit reports and
statutes providing immunity from prosecution for voluntary reports
of violations discovered in environmental audits. First, this Article
provides a historical background of environmental audit provisions
and reviews other privilege doctrines.2 It defines environmental au-
dits and specifically discusses discovery issues in the audit context.
Next, the Article details the state environmental audit statutes.3 It
then discusses EPA's policy encouraging environmental audits.4
The Article concludes, suggesting how other states can enact envi-
ronmental audit statutes that promote environmental protection
while still protecting the rights of private parties in the future.
2. For a further discussion of various privilege doctrines, see infra notes 1944
and accompanying text.
3. For a further discussion of state environmental audit statutes, see infra
notes 49-222 and accompanying text.
4. For a further discussion of EPA's policy encouraging auditing and self-cor-
rection of violations, see infra notes 223-41 and accompanying text.
[Vol. VIII: p. I
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A. The Need for Legislation Encouraging Environmental
Auditing and Self-Correction of Violations-Origins of
the Environmental Audit Statutes
In an effort to encourage businesses to perform environmental
audits, seventeen states have passed statutes making environmental
audits privileged to a certain extent.5 Eleven of the state environ-
mental audit statutes provide some degree of immunity from prose-
cution for environmental law violations discovered in an audit and
reported to authorities. 6 The legislatures of at least fifteen more
states are currently considering or have considered similar legisla-
tion.7 Bills intended to create a federal statutory privilege and to
provide disclosure immunity have been introduced in both houses
of Congress.8 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) re-
5. For a list of the states that have such statutes, see supra note 1.
6. Environmental audit privilege statutes in Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Minne-
sota, New Hampshire, South Dakota and Texas include immunity, from civil and
criminal penalties when a violation is discovered in an audit and is voluntarily re-
ported to authorities. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-1-114.5(4); IDAHO CODE § 9-809;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3333(a); 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168 § 13, subd. 1; N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. §147-E:9; S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 1-40-33; TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4447cc § 10. In Michigan, the regulated entity can avoid penalties for viola-
tions caused by negligence, but not those caused by gross negligence. MIcH.
COMP. LAws § 324.14809(1) (1996). The statutes of Mississippi, Virginia and Wyo-
ming provide immunity from civil penalties, but not from criminal prosecution.
See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-1 7-29( 7 )(g), 49-17-43(g) (vii), 49-17-42 7 (3)(g); VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-1199; WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1106. In New Jersey, a regulated entity
will not be penalized for certain minor violations that it promptly reports and cor-
rects, regardless of how the violation was discovered. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-130.
Six states-Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Oregon and Utah-have statutes
providing for an environmental audit privilege, but not for immunity from prose-
cution. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-303; 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/52.2; IND.
CODE ANN. § 13-11-2-68; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040; OR. REv. STAT.
§ 468.963; UTAH R. EVID. 508.
7. See Enforcement: Number of States with Laws Granting Audit Privilege Grows to 14
with Texas, 26 ENV'T RED. 270 (1995). Legislation including a privilege for environ-
mental audits was recently considered in California, Florida, Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
and Wisconsin. Id. Audit privilege measures were rejected in 1995 by the legisla-
tures of Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, and West Virginia.
Id. Further, bills introduced in New Hampshire, Oklahoma and Tennessee in
1995, were tabled for further consideration in 1996. Id. Audit legislation is ex-
pected to be introduced in 1996 in Alabama and Delaware. Id. In Arizona, legisla-
tion was passed by the state legislature but vetoed by Governor Fife Symington on
April 19, 1995. See Arizona Governor Vetoes Audit Legislation Amid Legal Concerns About
Provisions, DAILY ENV'T REp., April 25, 1995, at D-16. Legislation was introduced in
Pennsylvania on October 31, 1995. See S. 1295, 179th Leg., 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Pa.
1995). In 1996, Vermont also introduced a bill. See S. 314, Adj. Sess. (Vt. 1996).
In Missouri, new bills were filed in 1996. See H.R. 945, 88th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 1996); S. 529, 88th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1996).
8. The two bills are S. 580, 104th Cong. (1995), sponsored by Senator Hat-
field (R-Oregon) [hereinafter Senate bill 580], and H.R. 1047, 104th Cong. (1995)
1997]
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cently issued a new policy on the proper use of voluntary environ-
mental self-audits in enforcement actions. 9
The regulated community fears that prosecuting authorities
will improperly request and use internal environmental audits to
bring civil and criminal actions against parties. Primarily, it fears
that parties reporting violations discovered in the auditing process
will be unfairly penalized. Although such prosecutions are rare, ad-
vocates of the audit privilege argue that easing the regulated com-
munity's fears sufficiently justifies the privilege.10
Businesses are concerned that environmental audits, often un-
dertaken at considerable cost, will be used against them in subse-
quent legal proceedings. Business leaders object to the use of these
documents in environmental prosecutions, calling the practice un-
fair and counterproductive.'1 As a result, some businesses are re-
luctant to produce audits that prosecutors can use as evidence of
violations or as a "road map" for further investigations. Published
[hereinafter House bill 1047], introduced by Representative Hefley (R-Colorado).
The Bills introduced in the 104th Congress are based on the Colorado statute and
include provisions which would "immunize" a party from any administrative, civil
or criminal penalty for violations voluntarily reported to the enforcement authori-
ties. In 1994, Senator Hatfield introduced a more moderate version, based on the
Oregon statute and including the audit privilege only. See S. 2371, 103d Cong.
(1994).
9. EPA Policy on Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Viola-
tions with Summary Fact Sheet, Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure,
Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995), reprinted in
DAILY ENV'T. REP., Dec. 20, 1995, at d31 [hereinafter EPA Policy on Prevention of
Violations]. An interim policy on environmental audits was released in April of
1995. Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy
Statement, 60 Fed Reg. 16,875 (1995), reprinted in DAILY ENV'T REP., April 3, 1995,
at AA-1 [hereinafter Interim Policy].
10. See Enforcement: Legislation to Prevent Disclosure of Audits Backed by Industry
Groups, 26 ENV'T REP. 463 (1995). Corporate Environmental Enforcement Coun-
cil, Inc., a coalition of 67 companies and industry groups sent a letter to Congress
in support of the Federal Environmental Audit Privilege statute. Id. Steve Hellum,
spokesman for the group, claimed that "[b] ecause regulated entities and their em-
ployees are now under the constant threat of enforcement or third-party action
based on their own self-evaluations and disclosures, they are discouraged from
identifying and disclosing potential non-compliance. Id. See also Interview with
Stephanie Segal, counsel for Coalition for Improved Environmental Audits (April
3, 1995).
11. Such arguments have been urged repeatedly by industry leaders in sup-
port of federal environmental audit privilege legislation. This is shown in letters
published along with the 1994 version of Senator Hatfield's bill. See S. 2371, 140
Cong. Rec. S10,944-47 (daily ed. August 8, 1994). This is also shown in letters
published along with the 1995 version of the same legislation. See S. 582, 140
Cong. Rec. S4262-65 (daily ed. April 13, 1993). The regulated community also
made this argument in support of EPA Policy on Prevention of Violations, supra
note 9. Copies of EPA Docket, as well as any of over three hundred comments
considered by EPA, are available through the EPA Office of Air & Radiation,
Docket No. C-94-01.
[Vol. VIII: p. 1
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examples of prosecutors using audits against businesses are ex-
tremely rare.' 2 Nevertheless, many business advocates point to a
situation involving Coors Brewing Company, located in Colorado,
where the company became the subject of a state administrative en-
forcement action after it voluntarily reported violations discovered
in an audit.' 3 These advocates argue that any use of an environ-
mental audit against a company in subsequent litigation discour-
ages businesses from initially performing audits. 14 Why, the
proponents ask, should a company do investigative work that may
form the basis for either a state or federal prosecution or even a
citizen suit?
A recent survey performed by Price Waterhouse addressed au-
diting practices by U.S. businesses and discussed the businesses' ap-
prehensions. 15 The survey revealed that nearly twenty-five percent
of the companies who performed audits had some third party at-
tempt to discover or to disclose the audit material.' 6 Forty-three of
271 companies surveyed, and who performed environmental audits,
reported that either state or federal environmental agencies had
attempted to obtain the audit information.' 7 However, third par-
ties successfully obtained audit information in less than ten percent
of the cases where the company resisted disclosure.' 8
Most businesses, regulatory agencies, prosecuting authorities
and environmental groups involved in environmental policy mak-
ing recognize the need to encourage businesses to undertake au-
dits. The intense monitoring, scientific analysis and legal analysis
performed in an environmental audit is often the only means of
12. For a further discussion of the use of audits against businesses, see infra
note 265.
13. See Coors agrees to Pay Colorado $237,000 Penalty, 24 ENV'T REP. 1867 (1994).
Coors conducted an extensive audit, at a cost of $1 million. Id. The audit revealed
that substantial amounts of ethanol were released in the brewing process due to
evaporation of spilled beer. Id. It was previously thought that breweries were not
significant sources of volatile organic chemicals (VOCs). Id. In spite of Coors'
voluntary reporting and cooperation, the state health department initially pro-
posed a $1 million fine, later settling for $237,000. Id. The penalty included
137,000, calculated to be Coors' economic benefit of noncompliance plus a civil
penalty of $100,000. Id.
14. PIUcE WATERHOUSE LLP, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT SURVEY
OF U.S. BUSINESS (1995) [hereinafter PRICE WATERHOUSE SURVEY].
15. Id. Over 369 manufacturers within 14 industrial sectors responded to the
survey. Id. at 1. The study reveals both particulars of audits conducted by industry
and reasons why those who do not audit fail to do so. Id. at 22-69.
16. Id. at 34. The third parties were successful in obtaining the information in
approximately fifteen percent of the situations. Id.
17. Id. at 30.
18. Id.
5
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exposing environmental violations of which the company was previ-
ously unaware.
B. Other Protections for the Confidentiality of
Environmental Audits
Before states began to enact statutory environmental audit
privileges, several litigants successfully asserted that some other
privilege theory protected their environmental audit from disclo-
sure. These theories include the attorney-client privilege or attor-
ney work-product doctrine and the judicially created "self-critical
analysis privilege." Where the environmental audit falls into one of
the exceptions to the statute, the owner or operator may be able to
assert one of these traditional privileges. 19 Most of the statutes pro-
vide that they in no way limit, waive or abrogate the scope of any
statutory or common law privilege, including the work-product doc-
tine and the attorney-client privilege.2 0 Even in a jurisdiction
where a statutory environmental audit privilege exists, these other
privileges provide a worthy litigation tool to practitioners represent-
ing the regulated community.
1. The Attorney-Client and Attorney Work-Product Privilege
The attorney-client or attorney work-product privilege may
protect environmental audits where the company's legal counsel
was involved in the auditing process. This can occur when either
the legal counsel hires an environmental consulting agency to per-
form the audit under counsel's direction or the company forwards
all documentation to an attorney, designating it as "confidential at-
torney-client communication."
The U.S. magistrate for the Central District of California ad-
dressed the attorney-client privilege in Olen Properties Corp. v.
SheldahL21 The court held that the environmental audit memoran-
dum prepared by a company's own personnel and communicated
to its attorney for the purpose of securing a legal opinion was pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege. In Olen Properties the issue
19. For a more detailed analysis of the use of the attorney-client and work
product privileges to protect the confidentiality of audits, see Michael H. Levin, et.
al., Discovey and Disclosure: How to Protect Your Environmental Audit Report, 24 ENV'T
REP. 1606 (1994).
20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-312(a) (Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-25-126.5(a) (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 9-808 (Supp. 1996); 415 ILL. COMp.
STAT. ANN. § 5/52.20) (West Supp. 1996); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(e)
(Michie Supp. 1996).
21. 24 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,936 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
[Vol. VIII: p. I
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arose out of a CERCLA action brought by Olen Properties, a for-
mer building owner, against several of its tenants to recover
cleanup costs. The supervisor of environmental engineering and
safety for one of the defendants, BMC Industries, Inc., prepared the
audit and subsequently shared it with counsel for the codefend-
ants.22 The court upheld the attorney-client privilege, and also
found that the joint defense doctrine preserved the privilege even
where the attorney shared the information with a third party for the
purposes of conducting a joint defense.
The attorney work-product doctrine may shield audits con-
ducted in preparation for litigation. However, a drawback to pursu-
ing an attorney work-product theory in environmental audit cases is
that communication to third parties will often waive the privilege.
For instance, in situations where a company wishes to cooperate
with prosecutors in return for penalty mitigation, it risks waiving
the privilege if it discloses the audit report. Several federal circuit
courts have held that communication to government investigators
will waive the privilege in subsequent cases brought by third par-
ties.23 Moreover, in jurisdictions without audit privilege statutes,
nothing prevents the government from disclosing the audit to third
parties.24 Further, state or federal "freedom-of-information" laws
may even require such disclosures.25 The policy of the Justice De-
partment requires, however, that the violator "make all relevant in-
formation (including the complete results of any internal or
external investigation and the names of all potential witnesses)
available to investigators and prosecutors" in order to be favorably
22. Id.
23. See United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31 (lst Cir. 1995) (defendant
charged under RICO statute could gain access to otherwise privileged information
communicated to United States government by his former employer in coopera-
tion with investigation under theory that such communication was implied waiver
by former employer); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951
F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991) (where defendant itself voluntarily revealed information
to United States Department ofJustice and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in cooperation with an investigation, it waived privilege and could not assert
work product doctrine in subsequent civil suit); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard,
850 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988) (production of internal audits by defendant's em-
ployer, Martin Marietta, in cooperation with investigation of overcharges, consti-
tuted waiver of privilege; defendant who was charged with mail fraud in
connection with same investigation could obtain audits), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1011(1989); United States ex. rel. Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp., 886 F. Supp.
1243 (D. Md. 1995) (In qui tam action by former employee, defendant's voluntary
disclosure of documents to government during settlement negotiations constituted
waiver of privilege).
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considered for prosecutorial leniency.2 6 Therefore, companies
have a disadvantage in trying to protect the audit under the work-
product privilege.
2. The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege
The self-critical analysis privilege is a common law privilege
that has recently been applied to environmental audits. 2 7 First rec-
ognized in Bredice v. Doctor's Hospital, Inc.,28 the self-critical analysis
privilege protects from disclosure certain internal evaluations of a
party's own current or past activities. 2 9 Although Bredice involved a
hospital's routine staff meetings, the purpose of which were to eval-
uate the treatment and care given to patients, other courts have
since applied this common law privilege in a variety of contexts.3 0
The self-critical analysis doctrine potentially offers protection to en-
vironmental audits conducted without significant participation by
legal counsel.
26. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for
Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or
Disclosure Efforts by the Violator, July 1, 1991.
27. A party asserting a self-critical analysis privilege is required to meet the
following criteria: (1) "the information must result from a critical self-analysis un-
dertaken by the party seeking protection;" (2) "the public must have a strong inter-
est in preserving the free flow of the type of information sought;" (3) "the
information must be of the type whose flow would be curtailed if the discovery
were allowed;" and (4) the document must be "prepared with the expectation that
it would be kept confidential, and has in fact been kept confidential." Dowling v.
American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1992). For a more
comprehensive analysis of the use of the self-critical analysis privilege to protect
the confidentiality of environmental audits, see Peter A. Gish, The Seif-CriticalAnaly-
sis Privilege and Environmental Audit Reports, 25 ENVrL. L. 73 (1995).
28. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), affd without opin., 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
29. Id. at 250-51. In Bredice, a hospital held staff meetings for the purpose of
improving "through self-analysis, of the efficiency of medical procedures and tech-
niques." Id. at 250. The court found that there is "an overwhelming public inter-
est in having . . .staff meetings held on a confidential basis so that the flow of
ideas and advice can continue unimpeded. Absent evidence of extraordinary cir-
cumstances, there is no good cause shown requiring disclosure of the minutes of
those meetings." Id. at 251. Essentially, since the meetings were designed for the
purpose of evaluating self-improvement, the minutes were entitled to a "qualified
privilege." Id.
30. These include a federal court's application of the privilege to a party's
self-assessment of its own equal employment opportunity practices, Banks v. Lock-
heed-Georgia Co., 53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971), to academic peer reviews, Keyes
v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904
(1977) and to product safety assessments, Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 F.RD.
518 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). It has been applied in state courts, including NewJersey in
Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273 (N.J. Law Div. 1984) (holding that "evaluative por-
tions" of corporate accident reports are protected by the privilege).
[Vol. VIII: p. 1
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In Reichhold Chemicals v. Textron, Inc.,sM the federal district court
for the Northern District of Florida applied the self-critical analysis
privilege in a CERCLA contribution action. In Reichhold Chemicals,
the owner of a contaminated industrial site, Reichhold, entered
into a consent decree with the Florida Department of Environmen-
tal Protection, requiring it to undertake both investigatory and re-
medial measures regarding environmental hazards from one of its
industrial plant sites. 32 Reichhold sued eight defendants, including
former owners, for contribution under both CERCLA and Florida
law for its costs in cleaning up contaminated groundwater.3 3 Reich-
hold resisted discovery of its environmental audits regarding its own
activities at the site.34 The district court applied the common law
privilege of self-critical analysis, holding that the Reichhold envi-
ronmental audits were analogous to a "subsequent remedial mea-
sure" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 407.35
Not all federal courts agiee that the self-critical analysis privi-
lege should apply to environmental audits.3 6 For instance, in one
case a federal judge refused to apply the doctrine of self-critical
analysis in an enforcement action brought by EPA. In United States
v. Dexter,3 7 the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut
held that application of the doctrine to thwart an EPA enforcement
action would be contrary to public policy.38 Additionally, state
courts in at least two jurisdictions refused to apply this privilege to
environmental audits. In CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and In-
demnity Co., 39 the Superior Court of NewJersey held that a corpora-
tion that sued its insurers for indemnification of defense and
cleanup costs of hazardous waste sites must disclose its environmen-
31. 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
32. Id. at 524.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The district court found that Reichhold was entitled to a "qualified
privilege for retrospective analyses of past conduct, practices, and occurrences,
and the resulting environmental consequences." Id. at 527. Further, the privilege
was limited to reports prepared "after the fact" to provide "candid self-evaluation
and analysis of the cause and effect of past pollution, and of Reichhold's possible
role, as well as other's, in contributing to the pollution at the site." Id.
36. For a list of cases and commentators asserting that the self-critical analysis
privilege should not be recognized, see Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, 157
F.R.D. 522, 525-526 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
37. 132 F.R.D. 8 (D. Conn. 1990).
38. Id. at 10. In 1986, EPA had a policy of not routinely requesting environ-
mental audits. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004
(1986). Apparently, in this case, EPA found overriding reasons to request the au-
dits. See Dexter, 132 F.R.D. at 9-10.
39. 620 A.2d 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992).
1997]
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tal audits. Although the state of New Jersey previously recognized
the self-critical analysis doctrine in other contexts, the CPC Int'l
court refused to apply it in an environmental context. 40 The court
emphasized the public's compelling interest in environmental regu-
lation, rejecting the arguments that a privilege for the audits would
promote the public's interest in a clean environment.4' Because
companies face the threat of fines if they fail to discover and correct
the violations, the court dismissed the idea that companies might
stop conducting environmental compliance audits if no privilege
exists. 42 Similarly, in State ex rel. Celebrezze v. CECOS Int'l Inc.,43 the
Ohio court of appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to find infor-
mation privileged because of the public's strong interest in environ-
mental protection even though this jurisdiction had applied the
doctrine in other contexts. 44
In many respects, these traditional privileges provide greater
protection than the limited privileges in environmental audit stat-
utes. Thus, a company concerned about possible violations re-
vealed through an audit may choose to involve its attorney in the
auditing process to ensure that the attorney's legal opinion con-
cerning the existence of a violation remains confidential.
C. Discovery Issues Arising from Environmental Audits
Environmental audits are evaluations, conducted internally or
by outside experts, designed to identify environmental issues. EPA
defines an environmental audit as "a systematic, documented, peri-
odic, and objective review by regulated entities of facility operation
and practices related to meeting environmental requirements."45
Any discussion of the potential impact of the environmental
audit statutes on litigation must also address the various issues re-
garding the environmental audit privilege that may arise. First,
what documents does the privilege protect? The party opposing
the privilege would like to obtain the environmental audit report
(E.A.R.), and all attached documents, exhibits, photographs and
40. Id. at 468. NewJersey requires a party seeking to establish a new privilege
to show that similar evaluations would cease if confidentiality was not assured.
Here, the court found that the plaintiff did not meet this burden. Id. at 464-65.
41. Id. at 467.
42. Id. at 467-68.
43. 583 N.E.2d 1118 (Ohio 1990).
44. Id. at 1121. In Ce/ebreeze, CECOS offered a public policy argument that its
records revealing violations of environmental hazardous waste sites should be pro-
tected by the self-critical analysis doctrine. Id. at 1119.
45. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875-77 (1995), repinted in DAILY ENV'T REP., Apr. 3, 1995,
at AA-1.
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ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS
similar documents. The auditors may have generated some of these
documents during the audit process. However, the auditors proba-
bly also reviewed records, incident reports and internal company
memoranda that were not generated during the course of the au-
dit. Where a company does an internal audit a potential dispute
may arise regarding the documents that were actually produced as
part of the audit.
Second, can the party opposing the privilege obtain either tes-
timony of persons with knowledge of the audit or factual informa-
tion contained in the audit? Specifically, in order to establish that
there was a violation of environmental law, the opponent may seek
the testimony of persons who conducted the audit.46 Alternatively,
the opponent might seek the testimony of the persons who con-
ducted the audit in order to show knowledge by the violator; specif-
ically seeking the testimony of company employees who have
firsthand knowledge of violations.47 Finally, the party opposing the
privilege may want the testimony of an employee or other person
with knowledge of the facts in order to show that the employer ac-
ted knowingly, recklessly or with gross negligence. 48
Conversely, there are situations where the audited business will
choose to introduce its own E.A.R., a portion thereof, or the testi-
mony of a person with knowledge of the audit in litigation. The
audited business may use the E.A.R. to show the absence of negli-
gence or gross negligence after an accident. It may want to intro-
duce the audit to show it was not the source of pollution in an
enforcement action or toxic tort suit. Finally, it may try to intro-
duce the testimony of the person who conducted the audit to show
it was in compliance with all applicable laws.
These are a few of the basic issues that may arise when the
courts start to interpret the new environmental audit privilege stat-
utes. The extent to which an opponent can discover or admit envi-
ronmental audit documents as evidence will vary slightly with each
jurisdiction.
46. For instance, the existence of a violation would be directly at issue in a
citizen suit, or in a tort suit to establish negligence per se.
47. Another issue is whether an opposing party can compel an employee who
learned about violations during the audit to testify about those violations. For ex-
ample, a manager who learns of a condition through discussions with a lower-level
employee during the course of an audit.
48. For a discussion of knowing violations under environmental audit statutes,
see infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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II. OVERVIEW OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT STATUTES
A. Immunity from Penalties for Voluntary Disclosure
of Violations
"Immunity" or "amnesty" provisions allow a party who discovers
a violation in an audit and who voluntarily reports it to authorities
to escape penalties. To qualify under these provisions, the violator
must have remedied or be in the process of remedying the viola-
tion. States have various approaches when legislatively addressing
immunity issues. One common factor is that most statutes exclude
parties who have committed certain serious violations, such as those
that have caused off-site damage. In other formulations, some
states provide that where the disclosed violation does not qualify for
complete immunity, the voluntary disclosure reduces the gravity of
any penalty.49 Eleven states presently offer disclosure immunity or
reduction in penalties for violations discovered in an audit and vol-
untarily reported to authorities. 50 In addition, New Jersey recently
enacted legislation that reduces or eliminates penalties for viola-
tions promptly reported to state authorities, whether discovered in
an audit or otherwise.51 New Jersey's law was intended to, and
should be effective in encouraging auditing even though violations
discovered in other ways are included.
Immunity and privilege are two separate issues. Several states
offer a privilege, but no immunity.52 In two of the states with disclo-
sure immunity, the privilege operates only against the state.55 In
49. Colorado, the second state to pass environmental legislation, initialed
such a development. Colorado passed its law in reaction to the Coors Brewing
company case, where Coors was fined after it self-reported violations discovered in
an expensive voluntary audit. Cynthia Leap Goldman, a Colorado attorney, was
the principal draftsperson of this legislation. The chances were minimal that the
state authorities would have discovered Coors' audit survey. See Price Waterhouse
Survey, supra note 14. Over 369 manufacturers within 14 industrial sectors re-
sponded to the survey. Id. at 1. The study reveals both particulars of audits con-
ducted by industry and reasons why those who do not audit fail to do so. Id. at 22-
69.
50. COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-1-114.5 (1989 & Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 9-809
(Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3338 (Supp. 1995); 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
ch. 168 §13 (West); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-29( 7 )(g), 49-17-43 (g)(vii), 49-17-
427( 3 )(g) (1995 & Supp. 1996); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 10 (West
Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1199 (Michie Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-11-1106 (Michie Supp. 1996).
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-130 (West Supp. 1996).
52. Six states, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Oregon and Utah have
statutes providing for an environmental audit privilege but not for immunity or
mitigation of penalties for voluntary disclosures.
53. See IDAHO CODE § 9-804 (no state public official, employee or environmen-
tal agency can require disclosure of an environmental audit report); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws § 1-40-35 (Michie Supp. 1996). Note that certain audits or portions thereof
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states that offer both privilege and immunity, the issues are distinct.
For example, Virginia and Idaho have no requirement that the
party asserting the privilege show prompt efforts to comply.54 How-
ever, that party cannot avoid prosecution unless it has eliminated,
or is in the process of eliminating the violation. 55
1. Degree of Immunity Offered
Some states provide that the immunity can cover only civil and
administrative enforcement; others include immunity from crimi-
nal sanction. In eight jurisdictions, the statutes include immunity
from civil and some or all criminal penalties.5 6 The statutes of Mis-
sissippi, Virginia and Wyoming provide immunity from civil penal-
ties, but not from criminal prosecution.57 In a specific example,
Mississippi's statute provides for the reduction of the gravity por-
tion of a penalty, reserving to the state the right to recover the eco-
nomic benefits of noncompliance. 58
No state permits a party to escape criminal penalties for know-
ing violations. Specifically, the statutes of Kansas, Minnesota, South
Dakota and Texas expressly state that violations committed know-
ingly or willfully by the person claiming the privilege do not qual-
ify.59 Wyoming's statute excludes criminal violations, as well as any
violation resulting from gross negligence or recklessness. 60 Fur-
thermore, Colorado, New Hampshire and Michigan include immu-
nity only for those criminal violations resulting from ordinary
negligence. 61 In Mississippi, there is no express provision address-
ing knowing violations, however, because the statute requires that
may be privileged under the attorney-client or work-product privilege. Idaho pro-
vides that other existing statutory and common law privileges are not affected by
the code sections on environmental audits. IDAHO CODE § 9-808.
54. See IDAHO CODE § 9-809(2) (c); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1199.
55. See IDAHO CODE § 9M809(2)(c); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1199.
56. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 25-1-114.5; MICH. COMp. LAws § 324.14809(1); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-E:9 (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 9-809; KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-3338(a); 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 168 § 13; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-40-
33 (Michie Supp. 1996); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 10.
57. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-29 ( 7 ) (g), 49-17-43(g) (vii), 49-17-427 (3) (g);
VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1199; Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1106.
58. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-2 9 (7 )(g), 49-17-43(g) (vii), 49-17-427(3)(g).
59. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3338(c) (2); 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168 § 13
subd. 3(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-40-36; TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc
§ 10(d) (1). Mississippi, Virginia and Wyoming provide no immunity against crimi-
nal penalties at all.
60. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1106(a).
61. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-1-114.5(4). The violator has two years to
remedy the violation, but the Colorado Department of Health may extend the
time if it is not practicable to remedy the violation within that time. Id.
-1997]
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the violation be "discovered in an audit," it, in effect, excludes any
violation knowingly committed by that party. In comparison, Idaho
does not use the term "discovered" in an audit. Rather, it requires
that the disclosure arise out of an environmental audit.62 The es-
sential element is that the violation was "discovered" in a "volun-
tary" audit. This is an attempt to ensure that no violator can escape
penalties for violations that it knew of prior to the audit. As a gen-
eral rule, a party who commits a knowing criminal violation, is per-
petrating a more serious violation than negligence and, therefore,
would not be eligible for disclosure immunity in any state.
2. Unauthorized Acts of Agents and Employees
Because a corporation can only act through its agents, a poten-
tial issue may arise as to whether a corporation can qualify for dis-
closure immunity if its officers or employees acted knowingly in
committing the violation. Only one environmental audit statute
discusses the issue of acts knowingly committed by a party's
agents. 63 In Texas, if an agent commits an act knowingly, and poor
or nonexistent management systems contributed to the occurrence,
there can be no immunity.64
3. Exclusions for Repeated Violations
The potential use of disclosure immunity to protect bad actors
is minimized by provisions preventing immunity for repeated viola-
tions. In most states with disclosure immunity, the regulated entity
cannot qualify if it has a recent history of the same or similar viola-
tions. Colorado, Idaho, Michigan and Wyoming will not grant im-
munity to a violator guilty of repeated violations within the three
year period prior to the disclosure.65 In South Dakota, the re-
62. IDAHO CODE § 9-809.
63. See TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 10(d) (3).
64. Id. The Texas environmental audit statute states that immunity does not
apply if "the offense was committed intentionally or knowingly by a member of the
person's [making the disclosure] management or an agent of the person and the
person's policies or lack of prevention systems contributed materially to the occur-
rence of the violation." Id.
65. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-1-114.5(6) (1989 & Supp. 1996). In Colo-
rado there will be no elimination of penalties if the violator:
[H] as been found by a court or administrative law judge to have commit-
ted serious violations that constitute a pattern of continuous or repeated
violations of environmental laws, rules, regulations, permit conditions,
settlement agreements, or orders on consent and that were due to sepa-
rate and distinct events giving rise to the violations, within a three-year
period prior to the date of the disclosure. Such a pattern of repeated
violations may also be demonstrated by multiple settlement agreements
related to substantially the same alleged violations ....
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peated violation period is two years.66 In Texas, the violator cannot
qualify for immunity if it engaged in a pattern of violations after the
date the environmental audit statute became effective. 67 In New
Jersey, the person responsible for the violation must not have been
responsible for a violation of the same requirement of the same
permit or at the same facility within the preceding twelve months.68
In addition, that person cannot have a history of similar violations
that indicate a pattern of noncompliance. 69 In Minnesota, no party
can qualify for participation in its environmental improvement pro-
gram unless one year or more has "elapsed since the initiation of an
enforcement action that resulted in the imposition of a penalty in-
volving the facility. '70 Two statutes, Kansas and Virginia do not in-
clude similar requirements.
4. Exclusion of Violations Causing Serious Actual Harm or
Harm Off-site
Several states refuse to grant immunity or penalty reduction for
any violation that has caused substantial harm off-site. 71 For exam-
ple, in NewJersey, violations that pose more than a "minimal risk to
public health" are by definition not "minor violations." Therefore,
they do not qualify for the "grace period."72
5. Requirement that Disclosure Be "Voluntary"
One issue destined to be debated is the question of what con-
stitutes a "voluntary" disclosure to the authorities. Most state disclo-
sure immunity statutes, as well as EPA's penalty reduction policy,
Id. The other three states have a nearly identical provisions. See IDAHO CODE § 9-
809(6) (Supp. 1996); MIcH. CoMP. LAws § 324.14809(4) (1996); WvO. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-11-1106(d) (Michie Supp. 1996).
66. S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 1-40-36(2).
67. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 10(h). In Texas, the immunity
does not apply if the party, after the effective date of the environmental audit
statute, engaged in a pattern of disregarding the environmental or health and
safety laws. Id.
68. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-129(b) (5) (a), (b) (West Supp. 1996).
69. Id. § 13:lD-129(b)(5)(d).
70. 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 168 § 10 subd. 2 (West).
71. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3338(c)(4) (Supp. 1995); 1995 Minn. Sess. Law
Serv. 168 § 13 Subd. 3 (2)(ii); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-29(7)(g)(vi), 49-17-
43 (g) (vii) (6), 49-17-427(3) (g) (vi) (1995 & Supp. 1996) (the noncompliance must
not have resulted in substantial endangerment threatening public health, safety or
welfare, or environment); TEX. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 10(d)(2) (viola-
tion must not have been committed recklessly and have neither resulted in injury
to persons on-site, nor substantial off-site harm to persons, property or
environment).
72. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-129(b) (2) (West Supp. 1996).
1997]
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require that the disclosure be voluntary in order to qualify for im-
munity.73 Further, if the violator is otherwise required by law to
report the violation to authorities, the disclosure is not considered
"voluntary."74 The problem is that there are few violations that one
is not already required by law, regulation or permit to report if one
knows about it.75 Some critics of this provision argue that the im-
munity should depend on whether the audit was voluntary, not
whether the report of the newly discovered violation to authorities
was optional. 76 Possibly in response to such criticisms, South
Dakota's statute was drafted with no voluntary disclosure
requirement. 77
6. Requirement that Disclosure Arise out of a Voluntary
Environmental Audit
With the exception of New Jersey, all of the state environmen-
tal audit statutes require the disclosure to arise out of an environ-
mental audit. 78 Most explicitly require that the environmental
audit revealing the violation is also "voluntary."79 Thus, the violator
earns relief from penalties by its voluntary disclosure of privileged
information. Therefore, whether the audit itself is "voluntary" may
become an issue.
73. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-114.5(1), (4) (1989 & Supp. 1996); IDAHO
CODE § 9-809 (Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3332(a); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 147-E:9(I) (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-130; MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 324.14809(1) (1996); 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 168 § 10-13; Miss. CODE
§§ 17-17-29(7) (g), 49-17-43(g) (vii), 49-17-427(3) (g); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4447cc § 10(a), (b) (West Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1199 (Michie Supp.
1996); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1106(b) (Michie Supp. 1996).
74. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-1-114.5(3); IDAHO CODE § 9-809(5); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3338(b); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-29 (7) (g) (iv), 49-1 7-43 (g) (vii) (4),
49-17-427(3)(g) (iv); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1199; WVO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1106(b).
But cf TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 10(c) (a report is not voluntary only
if it is required by enforcement order or decree).
75. Barry M. Hartman & Leif B. King, Statutory Privileges and Immunities For
Environmental Audits: Policy and Practice, ABA FIFTH ANNUAL ENVIRONMENTAL EN-
FORCEMENT CONFERENCE, 1995, at 21.
76. Interview with Stephanie Segal, supra note 10.
77. S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 1-40-34 (Michie Supp. 1996).
78. COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-1-114.5(1)(b); IDAHO CODE § 9-809; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3338(a) (3); MICH. COMP. LAws § 324.14809 (1) (c); 1995 Minn. Sess. Law
Serv. 168 § 10, Subd. 1-2; Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-29(7) (g), 49-17-43(g) (vii), 49-
17-42 7 (3) (g); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-E:9(I) (Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 1-40-34 (Michie Supp. 1996); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 4447cc § 10(b) (4);
VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1199; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1106(a).
79. COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-1-114.5(1)(b); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3332(a); 1995
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168 § 10, Subd. 1-2; Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-29(7)(g), 49-
17-43(g) (vii), 49-17-427(3) (g); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 3(a) (3); VA.
CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198(A); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(a) (1).
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Two states have no requirement that the disclosure arise from
a voluntary audit. NewJersey allows a grace period for any violation
fitting its definition of a "minor violation," including violations un-
covered by the state or local government authorities.80 It imposes
no penalties as long as the person responsible for a minor violation
reports it within thirty days of discovering it, whether or not there
was an audit.81 In Idaho the privilege operates only against the gov-
:ernment.8 2 Idaho requires that the violation be discovered in an
audit, but does not explicitly require the audit to be "voluntary."83
Therefore, the statute minimizes potential abuse, such as a fraudu-
lent claim of privilege.
7. Burden of Proof
There are two basic requirements for disclosure immunity and,
therefore, two issues regarding the burden of proof. Under the ba-
sic scheme of most statutes, the party making the disclosure must
provide some evidence showing, first, that the disclosure was "vol-
untary," and second, that the corrective measures were appropriate
and timely. For example, in Colorado, the party making the disclo-
sure initially provides evidence showing that the disclosure was "vol-
untary" as defined by the statute. 84 The party must then show that
the disclosure was prompt, that it arose out of a voluntary audit,
and that efforts to remedy the violation were timely and appropri-
ate. 85 If successful in such a showing, there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the party making the disclosure is immune from
penalties.8 6 The burden shifts to the Colorado Department of Pub-
lic Health and Environment to rebut the presumption. In compari-
son, the Idaho statute creates a rebuttable presumption that a
disclosure was voluntary where certain elements are present, how-
ever, it does not explicitly require the party making the disclosure
to present evidence on those elements. 8 7 Under the Texas statute,
80. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-127 (West Supp. 1996).
81. Id. § 13:1D-130.
82. IDAHO CODE § 9-803(3).
83. Id. The definition of "environmental audit" does not include the element
of being "voluntary." Id.
84. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-114.5(4).
85. Id. § 25-1-114.5(1).
86. Id. § 25-1-114.5(4).
87. IDAHO CODE § 9-809(2). The required elements in § 9-809(2) (a) require:
"The disclosure is made by the owner or operator in a timely manner, after receipt
of the environmental audit report to the environmental regulatory agency having
regulatory authority." Id. § 9-809(2) (a). Section 9-809(2) (b) requires: "The dis-
closure arises out of an environmental audit." Id. § 9-809(2) (b). Section 9-
809(2) (c) requires: "The owner or operator making the disclosure immediately
1997]
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to create a rebuttable presumption that the entity is immune from
penalties, the party must establish a prima facie case that the disclo-
sure was "voluntary," prompt and in writing.88 In addition, the vio-
lation must not already have been under investigation at the time of
the disclosure, must not have caused harm off-site, and must be
remedied promptly.8 9 Three states, Mississippi, Virginia and Wyo-
ming do not discuss the burden of proof for mitigation of
penalties.90
8. Ability of States to Restrain Violations or Order Remedial Action
Even though the state agencies may not impose monetary pen-
alties for certain violations, the statutes do not prevent the state en-
vironmental agencies from using other theories to recover damages
or to control the timing and method used to correct violations. For
example, the Colorado statute provides that the section regarding
disclosure immunity "does not affect any authority the department
of public health and environment has to require any action associ-
ated with the information disclosed in any voluntary disclosure of
an environmental violation." 9 1 Idaho also reserves to the state envi-
ronmental agency the authority to "require remedial action
through a consent order or action in district court or to abate an
imminent hazard."92 Minnesota requires a participant in the envi-
ronmental improvement program to submit a performance sched-
ule, which is subject to the approval of the state pollution control
agency.9 3
Where the statutes do not expressly reserve the authority in the
states, the statutes usually speak only to immunity from the penalty
portion of the agency's potential recovery. For example, Missis-
initiates appropriate efforts to achieve compliance, pursues compliance with due
diligence, and expeditiously achieves compliance within a reasonable period after
the completion of the environmental audit." Id. § 9-809(2)(a)-(c).
88. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § (10) (b), (10) (f) (West Supp.
1997).
89. Id. § (10)(b).
90. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-29(7) (g), 49-17-43 (g) (vii), 49-17-427(3) (g)
(1995 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1199 (Michie Supp. 1996); Wvo. STAT.
ANN. § 35-11-1106 (Michie Supp. 1996). Mississippi does not discuss the burden or
the procedure for voluntary reporting. It requires the department take into ac-
count a voluntary report of a violation and reduce the gravity portion of any pen-
alty to a de minimus amount if the report was prompt, arose out of an audit, was not
otherwise required by law and if the remedial action was prompt and appropriate.
MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 17 -17-29 ( 7) (g), 4 9-17-43 (g) (vii), 49 -17-427(3) (g).
91. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-114.5(7) (1989 & Supp. 1996).
92. IDAHO CODE § 9-809(7) (Supp. 1996).
93. 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168 §§ 12, 13, subd. 1 (West).
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sippi's voluntary disclosure provisions will only reduce the gravity
portion of a penalty.94 The statute does not prevent the commis-
sion from bringing a civil or administrative enforcement action.
Therefore, the state can still bring an action to require remedia-
tion, recover its costs incurred, and recover the cost of damage to
wildlife, where applicable.9 5 Similarly, Kansas and Texas do not ex-
pressly reserve the authority of the state agency to order remedial
action. The statutes only speak of immunity "from administrative,
civil, or criminal penalties."96 The statutes do not appear to restrict
any authority state agencies have to order remedial action.
9. Effect of Immunity Provisions on Citizen Suit Actions
The prohibition of penalties for self-reported violations raise
inquiries as to whether citizens suits are barred under the environ-
mental audit statutes and whether citizens can challenge the state's
finding of immunity. For example, could a citizen plaintiff allege
that the violation falls under one of the exceptions to the immunity
statute, such as the exception for violations causing harm off-site?
There is no authority in the disclosure immunity statutes to al-
low citizens to challenge, in state court, the state agency's determi-
nation that the immunity applies to a self-reported violation. By the
same token, there is no language that prevents a citizen from bring-
ing an action against the violator after the state determines that it
will not impose a penalty for a specific violation. 97 In most cases,
the state's refusal (or inability) to pursue penalties will not prevent
the filing of a citizen suit.98 Only "diligent prosecution" of the vio-
lation by the state or EPA will deter citizen suit actions. 9 However,
94. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-29(7) (g), 49 -17-43(g) (vii), 49-17-427(3) (g).
95. Id. §§ 17-17-29(2)-(3), 49-17-43(b)-(d). Where any person has violated
hazardous and solid waste laws, the Mississippi Commission of Environmental
Quality can bring action for mandatory or prohibitory injunctive relief, an action
to recover its cost of remediation in lieu of or in addition to any penalty and an
action to recover cost of wildlife in addition to any penalty. The Commission of
Environmental Quality has the same remedies for violations of water quality laws.
Id.
96. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3338(a) (Supp. 1995); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4447cc § 10(a) (West Supp. 1997).
97. In such a case, the violator would presumably raise the immunity statute
as a defense. The citizen plaintiff can then either allege that the statutory immu-
nity from penalties does not apply, or seek injunction relief, restitution of damages
to wildlife or other damages exclusive of penalties.
98. See Maryland Waste Coalition v. SCM Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1474, 1484 (D.
Md. 1985).
99. See, e.g., Clean Air Act (CAA) § 304(b) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1) (B);
Solid Waste Disposal Act, [as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act.] (RCRA) § 6972 (b) (2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 7002(b) (2) (C).
19971
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if the state and the violator enter into a consent order regarding
how the violation will be remedied, the state's enforcement of that
consent order would impede a citizen suit.100 At least one federal
court has recently held that "diligent prosecution" by the state does
not require the state to assess penalties rather than rely exclusively
on other remedies.1 01
As an alternative, the plaintiffs could pursue penalties in fed-
eral court using federal citizen suit provisions. The prevailing view
in federal district courts is that the citizen suit provisions of a fed-
eral environmental law still apply even where the federal environ-
mental program has been "delegated" to the state.'0 2 Where EPA
has approved a state program, the state laws supersede the federal
law. Thus, the citizen suit is grounded on violations of state, not
federal, law.'0 3 Several federal courts have held that the federal
laws enable citizens to maintain an action in federal court alleging
violations of the parallel state law. 104
100. See, e.g., Arkansas Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th
Cir. 1994) (Consent order entered into with state requiring penalties and correc-
tion of past violations barred citizen suit), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1094 (1995). But
see Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F. Supp.
1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990) ("Sham" consent order entered with state after notice of
citizen suit would not bar citizens' suit).
101. Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Colo. 1994).
102. See ACME Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1237, 1244
(E.D. Wisc. 1995) (bringing of citizen suit available in instances where government
unable to bring CERCLA action); Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Min-
ing Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 986-987 (E.D. Wash. 1994) ("citizens suit to enforce an
'effluent limitation' can be based on allegations that the defendant is discharging
without an NPDES permit"); Sierra Club v. Chem. Handling Corp., 824 F. Supp.
195, 197 (D. Colo. 1993) (citizen group could bring action in federal court under
the citizen suit provisions of RCRA, § 7002(a) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 even
though the violations alleged were of Colorado state hazardous waste laws; Colo-
rado's laws had "become effective" under RCRA); Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 725 F.
Supp. 258, 261 (M.D. Pa. 1989) ("any person may commence a civil action on his
own behalf [against any government instrumentality] or any person who is alleged
to be in violation ...."). But see Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1352
(2d. Cir. 1991); City of Health v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 971, 979 (S.D.
Ohio 1993) (denying availability of citizen suit for violation of federal provision
superseded by state law); Clorox Co. v. Chromium Corp., 158 F.R.D. 120, 124
(N.D. Il. 1994) (holding state programs superseded Solid Waste Disposal Act viola-
tions). See also Craig Lyle Ltd. Partnership v. Land O'Lakes, Inc. 877 F. Supp. 476,
483 (D. Minn. 1995) (holding that while state permitting program supersedes fed-
eral permitting, thus preventing citizen suit under federal law for permit viola-
tions, citizen suit could still be maintained under portions of federal law to enjoin
"imminent and substantial danger") The court in Sierra Club noted that the EPA
also interprets the "citizen suit" provisions as granting a right that continues after
the permitting program is delegated to the state. Sierra Club, 824 F. Supp. at 197.
103. See Sierra Club, 824 F. Supp. at 197.
104. See ACME Printing, 881 F. Supp. at 1244; Washington Wilderness, 870 F.
Supp. at 986-987; Sierra Club, 824 F. Supp. at 197; Lutz, 725 F. Supp. at 261.
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The immunity statutes may affect remedies, but will not pre-
vent citizen suits from being filed in state courts. Instead, it is the
privilege statutes, not the immunity provisions, that may influence
citizens to file in federal court.105 If a citizen brings an action in
state court, the state law regarding whether environmental audits
are privileged will apply. If the action is brought in federal court
under the citizen suit provisions of federal law, federal law regard-
ing privilege will most likely apply. 106
10. Effect on Punitive Damages in Tort Suits
In toxic tort suits, plaintiffs can recover three types of damages:
damages to their property, damages to their health, and sometimes
punitive damages when the defendant's gross negligence or reck-
less behavior caused the injury. 107 An interesting question is raised
as to whether the "immunity" statutes would completely prevent cit-
izens from recovering punitive damages in toxic tort suits. A court
could interpret the prohibition on "penalties" for self-reported vio-
lations as a prohibition on any damages other than those for out-of-
pocket expenses. A court might find that punitive damages are
penalties even though they are paid to private individuals rather
than to the state treasury.
One argument against this interpretation is that punitive dam-
ages are a punishment for knowing or reckless behavior.108 They
are not a penalty for the environmental violation itself. Virginia is
the only state that specifies that the immunity does not affect the
rights of injured parties to pursue damages. 10 9 Only two of the ex-
isting statutes lend themselves to this interpretation. The Colorado
105. See Mark 0. Hatfield, The Environmental Audit Privilege Act, THE ErNvrL.
FORUM, April/May 1995, at 21. Senator Hatfield (R-Oregon), co-sponsor of the
Senate Environmental Audit Privilege Bill, has written that the potential for private
litigants to avoid the state privilege simply by filing in federal court is a principal
reason that a federal privilege statute is needed. Id.
106. For a discussion of the law applied in federal court, see infra text accom-
panying notes 314-22.
107. See, e.g., Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 278 (Utah
1982) (awarding punitive damages for waste water pollution); Kosmacek v. Farm
Service Co-op of Persia, 485 N.W.2d 99, 104 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (affirming puni-
tive damage award for chemicals on owners' property); Potter v. Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd in part, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d
550 (Cal. 1993) (affirming compensatory damages for fear of cancer, psychological
damage and disruption of lives).
108. See BLACK's LAw Dic'r1oNaRv 390 (6th ed. 1990) (defining punitive
damages).
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1199 (Michie Supp. 1996) ("section does not bar
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statute, for example, provides that "[i]f any person . . .makes a
voluntary disclosure of an environmental violation ... the person is
... immune from any administrative and civil penalties associated
with the issues disclosed .... -110 The use of the term "issues dis-
closed" rather than "violation" or similar terminology makes the
Colorado statute seem particularly broad. Kansas grants immunity
from "any administrative, civil, or criminal penalties for the viola-
tion . . . ."1l Other statutes make it clear that the penalties to
which disclosure immunity provisions refer are only those imposed
by the state.112
11. Conclusion
The various disclosure immunity statutes will be effective in
promoting environmental compliance. The statutes contain several
important limitations to prevent bad actors from abusing the immu-
nity provisions. In addition, the requirement that the violation be
discovered in an audit will doubtless inspire smaller businesses to
audit, where they may have never done so before. Furthermore, as
more regulated entities conduct thorough audits and make frank
disclosures, state agencies will have more information to recognize
environmental compliance problems that are likely to arise with
each type of regulation. This recognition will let the agencies know
how they can best assist the regulated community in its compliance
efforts, and it may also help the state agencies determine how to
focus enforcement efforts. In the future, the states may consider
the advantages of including other elements in the immunity provi-
sions. In particular, states may want to encourage businesses to de-
velop permanent environmental compliance management systems
110. CoO. REv. STAT. § 25-1-114.5(4) (1989 & Supp. 1996).
111. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3338(a) (Supp. 1995).
112. For example, Idaho declares the self-reporter "shall be immune from
state prosecution, suit or administrative action for any civil or criminal penalties
.... " IDAHO CODE § 9-809(1) (Supp. 1996). Similarly, Texas defines "penalty" as a
sanction "imposed by the state .... TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 3(5)
(West Supp. 1997). Wyoming provides that "the department shall not seek civil
penalties" against a person who voluntarily reports a violation discovered in an
audit. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1106(a) (Michie Supp. 1996). Minnesota provides
that "the state may not impose any administrative, civil, or criminal penalties" for
violations discovered in the course of an audit performed in accordance with the
"environmental improvement program." 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 168 § 13,
subd. 2 (West). In Mississippi, the statute does not use the term "immunity," but
provides that the state will reduce any fine to a de minimus amount where the
violation is voluntarily reported. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-29( 7 )(g), 49-17-
43(g) (vii), 49-17-427(3) (g) (1995 & Supp. 1996).
[Vol. VIII: p. I
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss1/1
ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS
by including violations discovered through those systems for poten-
tial disclosure immunity.' 13
B. Privilege
The environmental audit privilege is a very limited one-so
much so that one could say the privilege is defined by its limits.
The regulated entity in any given jurisdiction must follow strict
guidelines to ensure its environmental audit is privileged and re-
mains privileged. Statutes include requirements that the violations
be promptly corrected and create exceptions in cases of fraud or
actual harm to ensure that the privilege will not protect bad actors.
However, in litigation, the environmental audit privileges some-
times apply differently where the challenge is brought by a third
party litigant rather than when it is brought by state or local govern-
ment authorities. The difficulties faced by a private litigant range
from none in Idaho and South Dakota, where the privilege oper-
ates only against the state, to insurmountable in Michigan, where
the exceptions to the privilege apply only to the state.
114
1. Requirement of Prompt Initiation of Effort to Remedy Violation
To preserve the privilege, one important requirement, found
in most of the statutes, is that the owner or operator remedy all
instances of noncompliance uncovered in the audit." 5 If an audit
reveals both major and minor violations, the owner or operator
would essentially have to remedy all violations with reasonable dili-
gence in order to prevent any violations from being discovered in a
subsequent enforcement action. For instance, the Arkansas statute
provides that the privilege does not apply to an audit if "the mate-
rial shows evidence of noncompliance with... federal or state law
[or] ... [environmental] regulation [and] ... the person claiming
the privilege did not promptly initiate and pursue appropriate ef-
forts to achieve compliance with reasonable diligence."
1 6
113. The EPA has included this in its Policy on Prevention of Violations, supra
note 9, at 66,711. See infra text accompanying notes 223-41.
114. See IDAHO CODE § 9-804 ("[Nbo state ... official, employee or environ-
mental agency shall require to be disclosed an environmental audit report .... .");
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 140-35 (Michie Supp. 1996) ("[D]epartment [of Environ-
ment] may not request results of an environmental audit"); MICH. ComP. LAws §§
324.14804, 324.14805 (1996). Michigan's exceptions to the privilege are provided
in the section of the statute that creates procedures for the state or local govern-
ment to seize or demand the Environmental Audit Report.
115. This requirement is found in all the privilege statutes except Virginia
and Idaho.
116. Aic. CODE ANN. § 8-1-307(a) (3)-(4) (Michie Supp. 1995).
19971
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Virginia's and Idaho's statutes do not require a showing of
prompt efforts to comply in order to preserve the privileged nature
of an audit. Instead, Virginia's statute excepts from privilege any
document or portion of the document that demonstrates a "clear,
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or the envi-
ronment .... -117 Therefore, in Virginia the violator can do noth-
ing to correct a violation and still claim a privilege so long as no
evidence of a "clear, imminent, and substantial danger" to the pub-
lic is available to outsiders. 118
In Idaho, there is a presumption of non-disclosure and the stat-
ute requires only that the party asserting the privilege establish a
prima facie case by presenting evidence of "the existence of a writ-
ten environmental compliance policy or the adoption of a plan of
action to meet applicable environmental laws."1 19 Disclosure is ap-
propriate only if the state demonstrates that one of two exceptions
applies: that the privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose, or
that the "material is not an appropriate subject for an audit."1 20
Therefore, Idaho's statute falls short of a requirement that the vio-
lator come into compliance within a reasonable time to preserve
the privilege. Because opposing parties cannot challenge the privi-
lege on the grounds that the violator did not take prompt remedial
action, there is less incentive to take prompt remedial action than
in other states that have this requirement.121
Some of the statutes requiring an owner or operator to remedy
non-compliance include guidance regarding what would constitute
"prompt" efforts to comply. On a national level, the bill introduced
by Senator Hatfield (R-Oregon) would require compliance in or-
der to preserve the privilege.1 22 Where there are several violations,
several states allow the owner or operator to show reasonable dili-
gence by adopting a phased program for coming into compli-
ance. 123 This provision allows the violator to address the more
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198(B) (Michie Supp. 1996).
118. Id. § 10.1-1198(C). In Virginia, the party opposing the privilege has the
burden to prove, based on information independent of the audit, that an excep-
tion applies. Id.
119. IDAHO CODE § 9-806(3).
120. Id. § 9-806(2).
121. However, both Virginia and Idaho require the owner or operator to
come into compliance promptly in order to gain immunity from prosecution. Id.§ 9-809(2) (c); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1199.
122. Senate Bill 580, supra note 8.
123. For example, Colorado allows the multiple violator to institute 'a com-
prehensive program that establishes a phased schedule of actions to be taken to
bring the person or entity into compliance .... ." COLO. Rv. STAT. 13-25-126.5
(3) (B) (II) (Supp. 1996). Mississippi and Utah have similar provisions. See Miss.
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urgent violations first. Furthermore, this language allows for leni-
ency in instances where violations may require the installation of
pollution control equipment and may take a considerable time to
resolve. Where the violation is a failure to apply for a permit, some
statutes specify a time period within which submitting an applica-
tion would constitute a "prompt effort to comply."1 24
2. Voluntariness of Audit
Just as the "disclosure immunity" statutes require the audit to
be voluntary, in most states the statutory privilege only applies to
"voluntary" audits. For example, an audit undertaken as a "supple-
mental environmental audit" in settlement with the federal EPA or-
dinarily would not be considered "voluntary."12 5 One can easily
imagine other scenarios where the "voluntariness" of an audit or
disclosure is called into question. Is an audit conducted in re-
sponse to inquiries by the public "voluntary?" After notice of im-
pending citizen suit? How about in response to an accident?
Colorado answers this voluntariness question by explicitly pro-
viding that the privilege does not apply in certain situations, and
implies that asserting the privilege to protect audits conducted
under those circumstances is fraudulent. An environmental audit is
not privileged when:
a court of record, or... administrative law judge, after an
in camera review, determines that the privilege is being as-
serted for a fraudulent purpose or that the environmental
audit report was prepared to avoid disclosure of informa-
tion in an investigative, administrative, or judicial proceed-
ing that was underway, that was imminent, or for which
the entity or person had been provided written notifica-
CODE ANN. §,49-2-71(1) (b) (iii) (Supp. 1996); UTAH R. EVID. 508(d) (5). Arkansas,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Oregon, Texas and Wyoming do not specifically provide
for phased-in compliance.
124. For example, Arkansas specifically requires that if the violation is a fail-
ure to obtain a permit, the owner or operator has ninety days to submit, to the
Arkansas Department of Pollution Control, either an application or a schedule
showing when it can finish its permit application. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-307(b)
(Michie Supp. 1995). Indiana also provides that ninety days is timely for submit-
ting an application. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-2(b), 3(b) (West Supp. 1996). Colo-
rado, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oregon, Texas, Utah and Wyoming do
not specify a time frame for submitting applications.
125. For a discussion of audits as "supplemental environmental projects," see
infra notes 242-47 and accompanying text.
1997]
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tion that an investigation into a specific violation had been
initiated. 126
Not all statutes require that the audit be voluntary. Idaho does
not include the element of voluntariness in its definition of "envi-
ronmental audit."' 27
3. Waiver of the Privilege
a. Express and Implied Waiver
It is not always clear under what circumstances the owner or
operator waives the privilege. Eight states make it clear that any
waiver must be express. 28 The statutes of Indiana, Kentucky, New
Hampshire and Oregon state that waiver of a privilege can be im-
plied, but do not specify what constitutes an implied waiver.' 29
Three states, Colorado, Kansas and Wyoming are unclear as to
whether waiver must be express or whether it can be implied.' 30
Minnesota's statute does not discuss waiver at all.' 3 '
126. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3)(d) (Supp. 1996). This provision
would apply to prevent a party from asserting the privilege where an audit was
performed in response to notification of an impending citizen suit as well as an
audit performed in response to a state or EPA investigation.
127. IDAHO CODE § 9-803(3) (Supp. 1996).
128. See Aix. CODE ANN. § 8-1-304(a) ("privilege . .. does not apply to the
extent that ... [Ut is waived expressly. . ."); IIAHO CODE § 9-806(1) (prohibition
against compelled disclosure does not apply to extent that it is expressly waived);
415 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/52.2(d) (1) (West Supp. 1996) C'[p]rivilege ... does
not apply to the extent that it is expressly waived"); MicH. COMP. LAws
§ 324.14803(1) (1996) ("[p]rivilege may be expressly waived by the person for
whom the environmental audit report was prepared"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-
71(1) (a) (Supp. 1996); TEX. Rv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 6(a) (West Supp.
1997) ("[p]rivilege ... of this Act does not apply to the extent the privilege is
expressly waived"); UTAH R. EvID. 508(d)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198(B) (writ-
ten consent of the owner or operator is required to introduce audit report in
court).
129. See IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-7(a); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-
040(4)(a) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-E: 4(I)(a)
(Supp. 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 498.963(3)(a) (Supp. 1996).
130. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3) (a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3334(a)
(Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(i) (Michie Supp. 1996).
131. 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 168 § 15 subd. 2 (West). "After receipt
by the commissioner of a report that complies with section 10, subdivision 2, the
[documents related to the audit] are privileged as to all persons other than the
state provided that the regulated entity is in compliance with its commitments
under [the voluntary pollution prevention program]." Id.
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b. Distribution or Communication to Third Parties
In general, a legal privilege is waived where the information is
communicated to a third party.' 32 In the states where any waiver
must be express, communication to third parties will not raise the
issue of implied waiver. Where the statute specifically allows or
where it is silent regarding implied waivers, communication to third
parties may waive the privilege. Courts will usually find that there is
no "expectation of privacy," where the party entitled to claim the
privilege willingly distributes information to outsiders.
In the case of an environmental audit, however, some commu-
nications may be necessary to achieve compliance. This would in-
clude distribution to outside experts who are to help with
remedying noncompliance or improving management systems.
The Kansas statute specifically anticipates such communications
and preserves the privilege, but many other statutes do not address
this question.1 33 Because such communications would further the
purpose of the statute, courts may hesitate to interpret this as an
implied waiver.
Other communications, particularly those made under a confi-
dentiality agreement, are consistent with an expectation of privacy.
For example, the party entitled to the privilege may want or need to
distribute audit results to lenders and potential purchasers.' 34 The
Kansas environmental audit statute addresses this issue by providing
that disclosure made under a confidentiality agreement will not
waive the privilege.' 3 5
132. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 511.1 (4th ed.
1996).
133. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3334(b). The laws of Texas and Arkansas have
specific provisions for these communications; however, implied waiver is not an
issue in those states because the statutes clearly provide that a waiver must be ex-
press. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 6(b); Aax. CODE ANN. § 8-1-
304(a) (3).
134. See, e.g., EIZABETH GLASS GELTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT ch. 2
(1995) (discussing CERCLA's innocent purchaser defense).
135. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3334(c). Arkansas, Michigan and Texas also antici-
pate this issue, although these states require any waiver of a privilege to be express.
See Apx- CODE ANN. § 8-1-304(a) (3) (A) (disclosure made under confidentiality
agreement to potential purchaser, or existing or potential lender, customer or in-
surer); MICH. COMP. LAws § 324.14803(3) (A) (1996) (disclosure made to potential
or existing partners, transferees, lenders, or to a trustee, parent, or subsidiary);
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 6(b) (2), (3) (disclosure made under confi-
dentiality agreement with existing or potential partner, lender, transferee, or in-
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c. Introduction of the Audit or Portion of an Audit in a
Proceeding
In some jurisdictions, introduction of a portion of the audit in
a proceeding waives the privilege. The party entitled to the privi-
lege may think it advantageous to introduce only a portion of its
audit report as evidence. It may, for example, want to show that its
auditor determined the facility to be in compliance with certain
regulations or with its discharge permits. Therefore, the owner or
operator may have to face the dilemma of whether it wants to risk
losing the privilege.
Three statutes specifically provide that such disclosures will
waive the privilege. The Kentucky and New Hampshire statutes pro-
vide that if the regulated entity introduces a portion of the audit
report in any proceeding, it waives the privilege for the entire re-
port. 136 In a more narrow exception, the Wyoming statute provides
that if the holder of the privilege introduces any portion of the au-
dit report in a proceeding, the privilege is waived for those sections
of the audit report for that media. 137 This includes any disclosures
made to the state for purposes of self-disclosing violations. 13 8 In all
three jurisdictions, it is unclear whether the owner or operator has
waived the privilege for all subsequent proceedings. Obviously,
waiver is not a significant issue if the privilege is only waived in the
proceeding where the owner wants it introduced.
d. Disclosure to Government Agencies
The issue of waiver may also arise in private litigation when the
party claiming the privilege previously disclosed the audit to gov-
ernment agencies. In states with disclosure immunity, it would po-
tentially create an odd result if disclosure encouraged by a statute
also waived a privilege granted by the same statute. Under federal
law, several courts have found that a defendant waives similar privi-
leges for any future action if he discloses the documents to the gov-
ernment in cooperation with an investigation.13 9 State courts could
use a similar provision to interpret the state privilege.
136. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(4) (b) ("[s]eeking to introduce
any part of the report shall constitute waiver of the privilege . . . for the entire
report").
137. Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(i) (Michie Supp. 1996).
138. Id.
139. See cases cited supra note 23 and accompanying text. In Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philipine, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991), docu-
ments relating to outside counsel's investigations into alleged bribes by Westing-
house employees were disclosed to the SEC and DOJ under the terms of a
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Several states expressly provide that disclosure of the audit to
an environmental enforcement authority does not waive the privi-
lege. 140 In contrast, Wyoming explicitly states that the reporting of
violations in order to qualify for immunity waives the privilege. 4 1
Neither Mississippi nor Virginia address the issue. Because both re-
quire waiver to be express, however, one could not argue that the
disclosure constitutes an implied waiver.' 42 Colorado is the only
state with disclosure immunity that does not directly address this
issue and which may have an implied waiver.143 Therefore, of the
eight states that have "disclosure immunity," in only one may the
result of disclosure to government officials be uncertain.
Similar waiver issues exist in states where there is no disclosure
immunity, because violators will still self-report violations in those
jurisdictions. For instance, state law or the permit stipulations may
require the violator to report any known violation. Alternatively,
companies may voluntarily report violations to reduce the gravity
portion of any penalty assessed by the state or EPA. In the states
that do not have "disclosure immunity," only two consider disclo-
sure of privileged materials to the government.1 " Arkansas and In-
diana both preserve the privilege where a party voluntarily discloses
privileged information to authorities. 145
confidentiality agreement. Id. The court found that the documents were nonethe-
less waived for purposes of a later civil action by the Philippine government against
Westinghouse. Id. at 1419. United States ex rel. Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
886 F. Supp. 1243 (D. Md. 1995), also involved waiver by the defendant. However,
United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31 (5th Cir. 1995), and In re Martin Marietta
Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 (1989), involved
waiver by a non-party.
140. See ARi. CODE ANN. § 8-1-304(a) (3) (B) (Michie Supp. 1995) (made
under confidentiality agreement with government officials); IDAHO CODE § 9-
340(45) (1995) (audits submitted to agency are exempt from disclosure by
agency); IND. CODE. ANN. § 13-10-3-9(b) (West Supp. 1996)' (may be submitted as a
"confidential document"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3334 (Supp. 1995) (disclosure
made under the terms of a confidentiality agreement); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 324.14803(3) (b) (1996); 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 168 § 15 subd. 2 (West)
(audit information is privileged as to third parties only after it is disclosed to the
state); TEX. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 6(b) (West Supp. 1997) (disclosures
made under terms of confidentiality agreement).
141. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(i) (Michie Supp. 1996).
142. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (1) (a) (Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-
1198(B) (Michie Supp. 1996).
143. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3)(a) (Supp. 1996).
144. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-304(a) (3) (B); IND. CODE § 13-28-4-7(b) (Supp.
1996).
145. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-304(a) (3) (B); IND. CODE § 13-28-4-7(b) (Supp
1996). The legislatures of these two states may have been anticipating that the
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Where the state environmental audit privilege statutes are si-
lent on the issue, and waiver may be implied, disclosure of the
E.A.R. to government officials may waive the privilege. 146 To pre-
vent what seems to be a harsh result, and which conflicts with the
spirit, if not the letter of the law, the best solution would be to pro-
vide the authorities with a summary of the factual information and
not the privileged documents themselves. Because privileges pro-
tect "communications .... not facts," 147 a court should not find a
waiver in the communication of purely factual information.14
An interesting issue is whether the audit remains privileged af-
ter disclosure to regulatory authorities where the violation disclosed
does not qualify for immunity. For example, in those states where
any violation causing actual harm off-site cannot qualify for immu-
nity,149 would the owner or operator waive the privilege by disclos-
ing the violation to authorities? If the disclosure compromises the
privilege, the owner or operator would have less incentive to report
such violations.150 From a policy view it is even more essential that
a violation that may have caused off-site harm be reported than one
where the owner is confident that no such harm has occurred.
e. Failure to Request an In Camera Hearing
Several of the audit statutes allow state and local authorities to
obtain audit reports, then require the party asserting the privilege
to request an in camera hearing on the issue of privilege. If the
party entitled to claim the privilege fails to request an in camera
146. Several states have no implied waiver. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-304;
IDAHO CODE § 9-806; 415 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/52.2(d) (1) (West Supp. 1996);
Miss. CODE § 49-2-71(1) (a); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 61(a); UTAH R.
EVID. 508(d)(1); and VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198(B) (Michie Supp. 1996).
147. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (analyzing extent
of the attorney client privilege).
148. This argument failed in United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31 (1st Cir.
1995). In that case, the party claiming privilege had used the documents devel-
oped in its investigation to convince the United States that its employee, and not
itself, was guilty of mail fraud and RICO violations. Id. When the employee/de-
fendant sought the documents in preparing for his defense, the employer claimed
privilege. Id. Although it would be harsh to deny a criminal defendant access to
the information under these circumstances, a court may be less likely to find a
waiver in less compelling circumstances. Id.
149. For a further discussion of off-site harm, see supra notes 71-72 and ac-
companying text.
150. PRICE WAEMibOUSE SURVEY, supra note 14, at 47. According to a recent
survey, when companies that did not audit were asked why they did not, twenty
percent revealed concerns of audits being used against the company. Id. When
companies that did audit were asked what factors would make them expand ex-
isting auditing programs, sixty-five percent cited disclosure immunity, while forty-
two percent cited privilege as a factor. Id. at 28.
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hearing, the privilege is waived. All of the statutes with this provi-
sion require the state to follow similar procedures. 151 Typically, the
state environmental agency or attorney general's office can obtain
the audit report upon reasonable suspicion through subpoena, war-
rant or discovery, but it cannot review the documents. 152 The rep-
resentative of the state environmental agency must demonstrate
probable cause, based on a source independent of the E.A.R., to
believe that the environmental audit will reveal an environmental
violation. In the event that probable cause is established, the state
representative must immediately place the E.A.R. under seal and
may not review its contents. If the party opposing discovery or re-
sisting the warrant or subpoena fails to file a petition for an in cam-
era hearing within a proscribed time period, the privilege is
waived. 15 3 If the owner or operator makes a timely request for an in
camera hearing, the court must schedule a hearing within forty-five
days of the owner's request.154
The issue germane to private litigation is whether the failure to
request an in camera hearing waives the privilege only in the state
proceeding, or in future actions as well. For example, in a state
proceeding, the state may have sought the E.A.R. because it had
reasonable suspicion that there were more violations than those dis-
closed by the owner or operator. If, in fact, no more violations ex-
ist, it may be irrelevant for the owner or operator challenging the
state's action to request an in camera proceeding. If, after reviewing
the E.A.R., the owner or operator is confident that the state envi-
151. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-309; 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/52.2(e);
IND. CODE ANN. § 13-284-5 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3335 (Supp.
1995); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(5) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996); MICH.
COMP. LAws §§ 324.14804(1), 324.14805(1)(1996); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
4447cc § 9; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (v)-(vi) (Michie Supp. 1996).
152. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-309; 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/52-2(e);
IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-5; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3335; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 224.01-040(5); MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 324.14804(1), 324.14805(1); TEX. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 9; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (v)-(vi).
153. See ARi. CODE ANN. § 8-1-309(b) (must request a hearing within thirty
days); 415 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/52-2(e) (must request a hearing within thirty
days); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-10-3-7 (must request within thirty days); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3335(b) (thirty days to request in camera hearing); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 224.01-040(5)(b) (must request within twenty days); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 324.14804(1), 324.14805(1) (must request within thirty days); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 468.963(4)(b) (Supp. 1996) (must request within thirty days); TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 9(c) (must request within thirty days); WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-11-1105(c) (vi) (must request within twenty days). This is not the law in Colo-
rado, Idaho, New Hampshire, Mississippi, Minnesota, South Dakota, Virginia or
Utah.
154. The request period is thirty days in Kentucky and Wyoming. See Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(5) (c); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (vii).
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ronmental enforcement agency has no reason to bring an action,
the owner or operator may consider the matter unworthy of con-
testing. That is, unless failure to request a hearing in the state's
action would waive the privilege in future actions by third parties.
4. Exception to Privilege in Cases of Public Emergency or Danger
Seven states make an exception to the privilege in cases of pub-
lic emergency or where there is a substantial threat to public health
or property.155 In six states, this exception applies regardless of
whether the party opposing the privilege is the government or a
private litigant.156 Three states limit this exception to danger to the
public or property outside the audited facility.157 In Colorado, the
exception applies where the report shows a "clear, present, and im-
pending danger to the public health or the environment in areas
outside the facility property." 158 If a party, based on independent
knowledge, can show there is probable cause to believe the excep-
tion applies, then it can get access to the audit for an in camera
review. In the Utah environmental audit statute, there is an excep-
tion that "the information contained in the environmental audit
report must be disclosed to avoid a clear and impending danger to
public health or the environment outside the facility property."1 59
Wyoming's statute creates an exception to the privilege where infor-
mation contained in the E.A.R. demonstrates a "substantial threat
to the public health or environment or damage to real property or
tangible personal property in areas outside of the facility
property."160
In Virginia and Mississippi, the exception for public emer-
gency or danger apparently applies even where the danger is immi-
nent only to those inside the facility.1 61 In Mississippi, an exception
exists where "a condition exists that demonstrates an imminent and
substantial hazard or endangerment to the public health and safety
155. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3)(e) (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 9-
810(2) (Supp. 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-51(1) (d) (Supp. 1996); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 147-E:4(III) (Supp. 1996); UTAH R. EVID. 508(d) (4); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 10.1-1198(B) (Michie Supp. 1996); Wyo. STAT ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (ii) (D).
156. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3) (e); Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-
51(1)(d); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-E:4(III); UTAH R. EVID. 508(d)(4); VA.
CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198(B); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (ii) (D).
157. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3)(e); UTAH R. EVID. 508(d)(4);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (ii) (D).
158. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3) (e) (Supp. 1996).
159. UTAH R. EVID. 508(d) (4).
160. Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (ii) (D).
161. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (1) (d); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198 (B).
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or the environment." 162 Virginia's privilege, however, "does not ex-
tend to a document, portion of a document or information that
demonstrates a clear, imminent and substantial danger to the pub-
lic health or the environment .... 163
In Idaho, if "the governor deems an imminent and substantial
danger to the public health or the environment, the governor may
disclose such information excluding trade secrets .... "-164 It is un-
clear how the governor of Idaho will know that an imminent and
substantial endangerment exists when the audit report is secret.
This exception appears so obvious that it seems strange that not all
states with a privilege include it.165 However, each of the states that
do not have a public emergency exception do have an exception
for audits revealing uncorrected violations. 166 In making a decision
to omit the public emergency exemption, the legislatures may have
reasoned that provisions requiring prompt and appropriate correc-
tion would void the privilege whenever a continuing violation is
causing a dangerous situation.
5. Exception to Privilege Where Opponent Has a Compelling Need
for the Information
In some states the authorities can get the audit report if they
can demonstrate a substantial or compelling need for the informa-
tion and the information is not available from other sources.' 67 A
typical provision is Indiana's statute, which applies only in criminal
actions:
[the prosecutor can obtain an environmental audit report
if] the material contains evidence relevant to the commis-
sion of an offense .. . and: (i) the prosecutor has a com-
pelling need for the information; (ii) the information is
not otherwise available; and (iii) the prosecutor is unable
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the information by
any means without incurring unreasonable cost and
delay. 168
162. Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71(1)(d).
163. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198(B).
164. IDAHO CODE § 9-810(2) (Supp. 1996).
165. Arkansas, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oregon and
Texas have no such exception.
166. For a discussion of uncorrected violation exceptions, see supra text ac-
companying notes 115-24.
167. Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Texas and Virginia have no similar
exception.
168. IND. CODE § 13-28-4-3(a)(2)(D) (Supp. 1996).
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The statutes of Kentucky, New Hampshire, Oregon and Wyoming
all have similar exceptions that apply only in criminal pro-
ceedings. 169
In contrast, Colorado's statute has an exception, which applies
to any litigant, where the court determines that there are "compel-
ling circumstances" to allow discovery of the audit or admit audit
documents into evidence.17 0 The statute, however, does not in-
clude any guidance as to what would be a "compelling
circumstance."
6. Penalties and Damages for Disclosure of Privileged Material
Many of the statutes have damage provisions for unauthorized
disclosures of privileged materials. These come in two forms. Most
statutes only punish a party who violates a court order restricting
disclosure of the material. Two statutes, however, punish parties
not under court order who wrongfully disclose privileged materials.
Colorado has a provision typical of the first type. In Colorado,
any party who knowingly divulges information in violation of a
court order is liable for damages incurred by the party entitled to
the privilege.1 71 The Colorado statute operates by allowing any
party to gain access to an E.A.R. through an in camera hearing by
first showing probable cause that some exception applies.1 72 The
court then renders its decision specifying what information, if any,
the opponent can use in a subsequent proceeding, or otherwise di-
vulge.173 Any person who gained access to the audit in an in camera
169. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(4) (d) (4) (Michie 1995 & Supp.
1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 468.963(3)(c)(D) (Supp. 1996); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 147-E:4(IV) (b) (Supp. 1996); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (iii) (Michie
Supp. 1996). In Kentucky, the prosecutor can get the audit in a criminal proceed-
ing if "[t]he material contains evidence relevant to commission of an offense
[under certain sections of Kentucky environmental law] and the prosecuting au-
thority has a need for the information." Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(4) (d) (4)
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996). If there is an in camera hearing procedure, the prose-
cutor can review the audit for that proceeding. Id. § 224.01-040(5) (c). In Oregon,
the E.A.R. is available in a criminal proceeding if the state has a "compelling need
for the information, the information is not otherwise available and the district at-
torney or Attorney General is unable to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
information by any means without incurring unreasonable cost and delay." OR.
REv. STAT. § 468.963 (3) (c) (D) (Supp. 1996). New Hampshire requires the gov-
ernment to show a "compelling need and that the information is not otherwise
available." N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-E:4(IV) (b) (Supp. 1996). Wyoming's provi-
sion is nearly identical to Indiana's and Oregon's. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-
1105(c) (iii) (Michie Supp. 1996).
170. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3) (c) (Supp. 1996).
171. Id. § 13-25-126.5(5) (b) (I).
172. Id. § 13-25-126.5(5) (a).
173. Id.
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hearing is liable for damages caused by any disclosure of informa-
tion that violates the court's order. 174 Anyone provided informa-
tion by another person in violation of the court's order can also be
liable for damages if the person discloses the privileged material. 175
If that party is a state employee or a public official, the party may
also be guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor, held in contempt of court,
and fined up to $10,000.176
Mississippi and Texas have provisions for damages similar to
those of Colorado. In Mississippi, a court can hold a party liable for
damages, and can also hold both that party and his attorney in con-
tempt, imposing sanctions for violating its order after an in camera
review. 177 In Texas, any public employee or'official who discloses
information revealed under an agreement of confidentiality com-
mits a misdemeanor. 178 An attorney for the state may also be held
in contempt for wrongfully disclosing information applicable to sus-
pected criminal activity in violation of the in camera procedures. 179
The Texas statute also provides a cause of action for damages for
any unauthorized disclosure of material covered by a confidentiality
agreement. 180 In contrast to these damage provisions, under the
Utah statute any person who discloses information covered by the
privilege is "liable for all damages proximately caused," whether
under a court order or not. 81 A person who "willfully" does so is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor, subject to a civil penalty up to
$10,000, and subject to penalties for contempt of court. 18 2
The other environmental audit statutes have no provisions de-
fining damages for wrongful disclosure. This is not to say that in
those jurisdictions there is no legal recourse for the party entitled
to claim the privilege against a person who makes a wrongful disclo-
sure. The person claiming a privilege may have an action at com-
mon law under business tort theories or for breach of contract if
the disclosure violated a confidentiality agreement. The provisions
allowing the holder of the privilege to pursue damages raises the
issue of how to measure those damages. For instance, if it helps a
plaintiff win a case against the holder of the privilege, is the plain-
174. Id. § 13-25-126.5(5) (b) (I).
175. Id.
176. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(5)(b)(II).
177. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-51(3)(b) (Supp. 1996).
178. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 6(d) (West Supp. 1997).
179. Id. § 9(k).
180. Id. § 6(c).
181. UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7-104(2) (1996).
182. Id. § 19-7-104(3).
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tiffs recovery equal to the damages for wrongful disclosure? None
of the statutes allowing the privilege holder to pursue a cause of
action offers guidance on how to measure damages "proximately
caused" by wrongful disclosure of an audit.
7. Frivolous and Fraudulent Claims
Generally, plaintiffs will be denied the protection of the privi-
lege if it is asserted in a frivolous or fraudulent claim. Only two
states attempt to control frivolous assertions of the privilege by im-
posing sanctions. Michigan provides that a fraudulent assertion of
privilege is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $25,000.183
Texas holds a person subject to civil sanctions for wrongfully claim-
ing privilege for material he knows is not privileged. 184 Most of the
statutes provide that the privilege does not apply if asserted for a
fraudulent purpose.1 5 However, most give little or no guidance in
characterizing what constitutes a fraudulent purpose. The Virginia
and New Hampshire statutes provide a little more explicit language
than most. New Hampshire states that undertaking an audit to
avoid disclosing "violations known to exist or reasonably believed to
183. MICH. COMP. LAws § 324.14807 (1996) ("person who uses this part to
commit fraud is guilty of a misdemeanor ...").
184. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 7(d) (West Supp. 1997).
185. SeeARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-307(a) (1) (Michie Supp. 1995) ("[r]equir[ing]
disclosure of material for which the privilege ... is asserted, if... [the] privilege is
asserted for a fraudulent purpose ... ."); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3)(d)
(Supp. 1996) (refusing privilege when in camera review leads to determination that
privilege was asserted for a fraudulent purpose"); IDAHO CODE § 9-806(2) (a)
(Supp. 1996) ("prohibition against disclosure does not apply if... [pirotection for
the audit report is for fraudulent purpose"); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/52-
2(d) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring disclosure if privilege asserted for fraud-
ulent purpose); IND. CODE § 13-28-4-2(a) (2) (A) (Supp. 1996) (disclosure required
if the privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3334(d) (1) (Supp. 1995) (requiring disclosure if privilege asserted for fraudulent
purpose); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(4) (c) (1) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996)
(requiring disclosure if, after private review, it is determined that privilege asserted
for fraudulent purpose); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 324.14804(4) (a), 324.14805(4) (a)
(1996) (asserting privilege for a fraudulent purpose necessitates disclosure); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 49-2-71(1)(c) (Supp. 1996) (requiring disclosure if the privilege is
being asserted for a fraudulent purpose); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-
E:4(IV) (a) (1) (Supp. 1996) (privilege shall not apply if the court determines that
the environmental audit was undertaken for a fraudulent purpose); OR. REv. STAT.
§§468.963(3)(b)(A), 468.963(3)(c)(A) (Supp. 1996) (asserting privilege for
fraudulent purpose results in disclosure in civil, criminal and administrative pro-
ceedings); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § (7) (a) (1) (West Supp. 1997)
("[C]ourt... may require disclosure of a portion of an audit report ... if the court
... determines [that] ... the privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose"); UTAH
R. EVID. 508(d) (2) (no privilege exists if it is being asserted for a fraudulent pur-
pose); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (ii) (A) (Michie 1996) (disclosure may be
required when privilege asserted for fraudulent purpose).
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exist by the regulated entity" is included in the definition of
fraud. 186 Virginia's privilege does not extend to documents "gen-
erated or developed in bad faith." 18 7
8. Burden of Proof
Determining which party carries the burden of proving the
privilege will be a major factor in determining the extent of protec-
tion the various environmental audit statutes offer. The state stat-
utes differ regarding who has the burden of proof. Most require
that the party asserting the privilege establish a primafacie case that
the privilege exists. 188
The issue of which party has the burden of showing whether
the facility has corrected all violations with due diligence will be a
crucial one. In about half of the states with a privilege statute, the
party asserting the privilege has the burden of showing reasonable
diligence in correcting the violation in order to assert the privi-
lege. 189 In Colorado, Mississippi, Texas and Utah, after the party
asserting the privilege establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the party opposing the privilege to show that an exception
186. N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 147-E:4(IV) (a) (1).
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198(B) (Michie Supp. 1996).
188. See Aax. CODE ANN. § 8-1-310(a) ("party asserting the environmental au-
dit privilege ... has the burden of proving the privilege . . ."); COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 13-25-126.5(7) (Supp. 1996) ("[plerson ... asserting... privilege has burden of
proving a prima facie case as to the privilege"); IDAHO CODE § 9-806(3) (Supp.
1996) ("[t] he existence of a written environmental compliance policy or adoption
of a plan of action to meet applicable environmental laws shall constitute prima
facie evidence that an environmental audit report . . . is protected from disclo-
sure"); IND. CODE § 13-28-4-4(a) (Supp. 1996) (party asserting privilege has burden
of proving that "the party may exercise the privilege"); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 5/52.2(d) (3) ("owner or operator asserting the environmental audit privilege
.. has the burden of demonstrating the applicability of the privilege"); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3334(e) (1) ("party asserting the audit privilege . . . has the burden of
demonstrating the applicability of the privilege"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-
040(4) (e) (a party asserting the privilege has the burden of proving the privilege);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71(5) ("person asserting a voluntary self-evaluation privi-
lege has the burden of proving a prima facie case as to the privilege"); OR. REV.
STAT. § 468.963(3) (d) (party asserting the environmental privilege has burden of
proving the privilege); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § (5) (f) ("party assert-
ing the privilege . . . has the burden of establishing the applicability of the privi-
lege"); UTAH R. EVID. 508(f) ("person asserting the environmental self-evaluation
privilege has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of privilege"); Wvo.
STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (iv) (party asserting privilege has the burden of proving
the privilege). Minnesota is the exception. 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 168
§ 15 subd. 2 (West).
189. See AR. CODE ANN. § 8-1-310(a); IND. CODE § 13-28-4(b); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3334(d) (2) (I) (4); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(4) (e); OR. REv.
STAT. § 468.963(3)(d); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (iv).
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under the statute applies. 190 The Illinois statute provides that
where the state is the party opposing the privilege, it has the bur-
den of proving that one of the exceptions applies. 91 Illinois does
not expressly shift the burden where the opponent is not the state.
Finally, in Idaho and Virginia, the owner or operator does not have
to correct all violations in order to claim the privilege. Therefore,
no one has a "burden of proof' on this issue in those
jurisdictions. 192
Most of the statutes place the burden of proving that the privi-
lege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose on the party opposing the
privilege.193 Moreover, in those states where the state or district
attorney can get the audit by showing a "compelling need," the
state has the burden of proving that issue.' 94 For example, in the
Colorado statute, where a private litigant can also get the audit re-
190. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(7) ("party seeking disclosure has ...
the burden of proving that such privilege does not exist.. ."); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 49-2-71(5); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § (7)(b); UTAH R. EVID. 508(0.
In Colorado and Mississippi, the burden is particularly difficult for the opposing
party, because in both jurisdictions the opposing party must first show the court
probable cause, based on independent knowledge, that an exception to the privi-
lege applies in order to request an in camera hearing on the issue. COLO. REv.
STAT. § 13-25-126.5(5) (a); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71(3) (a).
191. 415 ILL. COmP. STAT. ANN. § 5/52.2(d) (3), (e)(5).
192. For a further discussion of violation correction, see supra notes 117-21
and accompanying text. In Idaho, the party asserting the privilege only has to
show the existence of a "written compliance policy or adoption of a plan of action"
to comply with environmental laws. IDAHO CODE § 9-806(3) (Supp. 1996).
193. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-310(b) ("party seeking disclosure ... has the
burden of proving the privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose"); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 13-25-126.5(7); IDAHO CODE § 9-806(3); IND. CODE § 13-28-4-4(c); 415 ILL.
COMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/52(d)(3) (state must prove elements to obtain disclosure);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3334(e) (2) ("party seeking disclosure ... has the burden of
proving that the burden is asserted for a fraudulent purpose"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 224.01-040(4) (e) (party seeking disclosure has burden of showing fraudulent
purpose); Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (5); OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963(3) (d) ("[P]arty
seeking disclosure.. . has the burden of proving that the privilege is asserted for a
fraudulent purpose"); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § (7) (b) (fraudulent
purpose must be proven by party seeking disclosure); UTAH R. EVID. 508(0; VA.
CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198(B)-(C) (Michie Supp. 1996) (the term "bad faith" rather
than "fraud" is used and "[p ] arty seeking disclosure ... has the burden of proving
the applicability of an exception"); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(iv) ("party
seeking disclosure ... has the burden of proving that the privilege is asserted for a
fraudulent purpose").
194. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(7) (any party seeking discovery has
burden of proving "that the privilege does not exist"); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 468.963(3)(d); UTAH K EVID. 508(d)(2) (state has the burden of showing a
"clear and impending danger" to public health); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198(B)
("clear, imminent and substantial danger"); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (iv).
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port in "compelling circumstances," that party has the burden of
proving the "compelling circumstances." 195
9. Other Special Restrictions
Many states prescribe audit procedures in order to bring them
under the purview of the statute. For example, Wyoming requires,
by definition, that an audit be completed within 180 days of initia-
tion, otherwise the audit would not qualify for the privilege under
the statute or for disclosure immunity. 196 In Texas, the owner or
operator must give advance notice to the state agency of his inten-
tion to audit the facility in order to qualify for disclosure immu-
nity.197 Texas does not require that the operator give advance
notice of the audit for the report to be privileged. 198 Further, in
Texas, the owner or operator must complete the audit within a rea-
sonable time not exceeding six months, unless the applicable regu-
latory authority approves an extension. 199 Several states also
require that the audit documents be labeled "environmental audit"
and "privileged," or similar words, in order to qualify for the
privilege.200
Some states require a party intending to take advantage of the
privilege or immunity provisions to give advance notice to the state.
In Texas, in order to receive immunity, the party must give notice
to the appropriate regulatory agency of the fact that it is planning
to commence the audit.20 1 The notice must describe the facility,
the time the audit will begin, and the scope of the audit.20 2 Minne-
195. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(7).
196. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(a) (i).
197. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 10(g).
198. See id. § 10.
199. Id. § 4(e).
200. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-302(4) (Michie Supp. 1995) ("Environmental
Audit Report; Privileged Document"); IDAHO CODE § 9-803(4) (Supp. 1996) ("En-
vironmental Audit Report" or substantial equivalent); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 5/52.2(i) (West Supp. 1996) ("Environmental Audit Report: Privileged Docu-
ment"); IND. CODE § 13-11-2-69 ("Environmental Audit Report: Privileged Docu-
ment"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3332 to 3339 (Supp. 1995) ("Audit Report:
Privileged Document"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(1)(b) (Michie 1995 &
Supp. 1996) ("environmental audit report: privileged documents"); OR. REv.
STAT. § 468.963(6) (b) (Supp. 1996) ("Environmental Audit Report: Privileged
Document"); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(a) (ii) ("Environmental Audit Report:
Privileged Document"). In Texas, a report "should be labeled 'compliance report:
privileged document'" or similar words, but failure to do so does not waive privi-
lege. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 4(d). There is no labeling require-
ment in Colorado, Mississippi, Utah or Virginia.
201. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 10(g). However, advanced notice
is not required for privilege. Id. § 7.
202. Id. § lO(g).
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sota's environmental improvement program requires all partici-
pants to conduct an audit and file a report of their results within
forty-five days after the audit is complete.203 The privilege attaches
after the regulated entity makes a report to the commissioner of the
state pollution control agenct. 2 0 4 Except for certain serious viola-
tions, the pollution control agency grants deferred enforcement
and waives penalties for all violations discovered.20 5
10. Testimonial Privilege
Several state statutes include a limited testimonial privilege
that prevents persons involved in producing the audit from divulg-
ing information relating to the investigation. 20 6 Typically these pro-
visions keep third parties from using direct testimony to circumvent
the privilege attached to E.A.R. The testimonial privilege may ap-
ply either solely to the party involved in producing the audit or may
extend to any person to whom the audit is disclosed. In Illinois "an
officer or employee involved with the environmental audit, or any
consultant who is hired for the purpose of performing the environ-
mental audit, may not be examined as to the environmental audit
or the environmental audit report .... ,"207 The Kansas statute pre-
vents "any person who conducted the audit [and] ... anyone to
whom the audit results are disclosed, unless such disclosure consti-
tutes a waiver... [from] be[ing] compelled to testify regarding any
matter which was the subject of the audit .... "20 8 In Virginia, no
person involved in preparing the audit or who has possession of the
report can be compelled to disclose the document, information
about its contents or the details of its preparation.2 9
An individual involved in preparing the audit who is also a wit-
ness to the violation may sometimes be permitted to testify about
the events comprising the violation to prevent a regulated entity
from covering up a known violation by involving all witnesses in a
subsequent audit. The Texas statute illustrates this distinction:
203. 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 168 § 10, subd. 2 (West).
204. See id. § 15.
205. See id. § 10-13.
206. See 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/52.2(c) (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3333(b) (Supp. 1995); MicH. COMP. LAwS § 324.14802(4) (1996); TEX.
Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 5(c), (d) (West Supp. 1997); See also VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-1198(B) (Michie Supp. 1996). Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana,
New Hampshire, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah and Wyo-
ming do not have a testimonial privilege.
207. 415 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/52.2(c).
208. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3333(b) (Supp. 1995).
209. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198(B).
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A person who conducts or participates in the preparation
of an environmental or health and safety audit and who
has actually observed physical events of violation, may tes-
tify about those events but may not be compelled to testify
about or produce documents related to the preparation of
any privileged part of an environmental or health and
safety audit or [related documents listed elsewhere in the
statute] .210
11. Audits Exempt from State Freedom of Information Laws
Many jurisdictions protect information disclosed to state au-
thorities in accordance with the environmental audit statutes from
public requests for the information under state freedom of infor-
mation statutes. Most of the states that have adopted disclosure im-
munity statutes include similar provisions. 21' A few of the states
that have not adopted disclosure immunity statutes, however, also
include these provisions.2 12 Where a state does not have disclosure
immunity, the exemption from freedom of information laws may be
necessary to protect documents that prosecutors obtained for the
purposes of an in camera hearing.213 Unlike most states with disclo-
sure immunity, Wyoming makes the environmental audit reports
presumptively available to the public.214 It puts the burden on the
regulated entity to show that its records would reveal trade secrets
and should therefore remain confidential.2 1 5 While Arkansas does
not exempt environmental audits from its Freedom of Information
Act,21 6 the state does allow the owner or operator to disclose the
audit to government officials under the terms of a confidentiality
agreement.2 1 7 On a quarterly basis, Minnesota publishes the names
210. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 5(c), (d).
211. See IDAHO CODE § 9-340(45) (1995) (exempts from Freedom of Informa-
tion Act "[v] oluntarily prepared environmental audits, and voluntary disclosures of
information submitted.., to an environmental agency ... which are claimed to be
confidential business information"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3334; Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 49-2-71 (Supp. 1996) (audits that are privileged are also exempt from the provi-
sions of the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983, Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-61-11);
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.124 (health, safety or environmental audits that qual-
ify for the privilege are exempt from freedom of information requirements).
212. See IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-4 (Supp. 1996) (party may submit environ-
mental audit report to department as "confidential document" under state free-
dom of information law); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7-104(4) (1996).
213. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7-104(4) (1996).
214. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1101(a) (Michie 1997).
215. Id.
216. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-312(b) (Michie Supp. 1995); Arkansas Free-
dom of Information Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-101 to 107 (Michie 1996).
217. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-304(a) (3) (B).
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and locations of the facilities that submit environmental audit re-
ports to the state as part of its "environmental improvement" pro-
gram.218 If the regulated entity has included a performance
schedule, that information is also published.219 All other informa-
tion remains confidential. 220
Colorado and Virginia, two states with disclosure immunity, do
not expressly exempt audit reports from their respective Freedom
of Information acts.221 Colorado's version of the Freedom of Infor-
mation law renders all privileged information and trade secrets ex-
empt from public disclosure requirements. 222 Virginia, however,
does not have a similar general exception for privileged informa-
tion in its Freedom of Information Act.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH-EPA's NEW POLICY
ENCOURAGING ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS
A. EPA Policy on Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and
Prevention of Violations
EPA's new policy encouraging auditing and self-correction of
violations offers an approach that avoids the potential pitfalls associ-
ated with an environmental audit privilege.223 EPA opposes a privi-
lege to the extent it would operate against enforcement
authorities. 22 4 It has developed a policy designed to achieve the
same result as the state privilege statutes without keeping the audit
secret from EPA.
After an eighteen month study by its Office of Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance, EPA released its new policy regarding
environmental audits on December 22, 1995.225 Prior to the re-
lease of the new policy, the department released an interim policy
on March 31, 1995, followed by a period for public comment.22 6 In
218. 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 168 § 11 (West).
219. Id.
220. Id. § 13.
221. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-204 (1988 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 2.1-342 (Michie 1950).
222. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-204(3) (a) (IV).
223. EPA Policy on the Prevention of Violations, supra note 9, at 66,706-07.
224. Id. at 66,710.
225. Id. at 66,706. This policy is the final policy and aims to "protect[]
health and the environment by encouraging regulated entities to voluntarily dis-
cover, and disclose and correct violations of environmental requirements." Id. As
a reward to those who voluntarily audit, identify and correct violations, EPA in-
tends a significant reduction in "the gravity component of civil penalties and ...
[in the] recommending [of] cases for criminal prosecution." Id.
226. Interim Policy, supra note 9, at 16,875.
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addition to public comments, EPA considered existing EPA and
other federal policies regarding auditing, self-disclosure and correc-
tion, relevant surveys on auditing practices and state and local poli-
cies and legislation. 227
EPA's new policy differs substantially from the interim policy.
In the new policy, EPA has developed and fine-tuned several ideas
that will encourage the regulated community to vigorously discover
and self-correct violations.228 Even the difference in the titles of the
two policies is telling.2 29 The new policy rewards a spectrum of re-
sponsible environmental compliance efforts. Unlike the interim
policy, the final policy gives the potential for immunity to compa-
nies who report violations discovered through demonstrated due
diligence as well as those violations discovered during an audit.23 0
This encourages companies to implement permanent environmen-
tal management systems which may be more appealing to certain
industries than periodic or one-time audits.
EPA's new policy has the following important features: (1)
where violations are discovered through voluntary environmental
audits or due diligence efforts, and all other conditions are met,
EPA will not seek any gravity-based penalties against the violator,231
nor will EPA recommend the case to the Department of Justice for
227. Id. See also Statement accompanying the March 31 release of its Interim
Policy Statement. On July 27, 1994, over 400 representatives of industry, state offi-
cials and environmental groups attended a public meeting. InJanuary 1995, a day-
long focus group meeting was conducted in the offices of EPA Region IX in San
Francisco with the participation of fifty invitees including representatives from in-
dustry, trade associations, state attorneys general offices, district attorneys and en-
vironmental agencies and representatives from environmental and public interest
groups. The day after the focus group met, EPA and DOJ held another public
comment session in San Francisco. EPA considered over eighty written comments
submitted to the environmental auditing policy docket. See Statement accompany-
ing the March 31 release of its Interim Policy Statement. EPA considered over 300
comments submitted after the release of the Interim Policy Statement. Id.
228. EPA Policy on the Prevention of Violations, supra note 9, at 66,707-12.
229. The policy released in April, 1995, was entitled "Voluntary Environmen-
tal Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy Statement," whereas the revised
final version is entitled "Policy on Discovery, Disclosure and Prevention of Viola-
tions." See id. See also Interim Policy, supra note 9.
230. Compare EPA Policy on Prevention of Violations, supra note 9, at 66,711
with Interim Policy, supra note 9.
231. EPA Policy on Prevention of Violations, supra note 9, at 66,710-11. The
due diligence requirements, set forth in Section B, require: (1) that the regulated
entity have compliance policies; (2) that overall responsibility for overseeing com-
pliance and responsibility at each facility is assigned to specific persons; (3) that
the entity have mechanisms to ensure that monitoring is adequate to detect viola-
tions; and (4) that the entity communicate environmental policy standards and
procedures to employees and also provide incentives to management and employ-
ees to ensure compliance. Id. at 66,710.
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criminal prosecution of the company if the unauthorized criminal
conduct of an employee caused the violation;232 (2) if a violation
not found through an audit or compliance management system is
promptly reported and corrected, EPA will reduce the gravity-based
portion of the penalty by seventy-five percent, providing that all
conditions are met;2 33 (3) EPA will continue, at its discretion, to
impose penalties to recover the "economic benefits of noncompli-
ance;"2 3 4 (4) violators must remedy any environmental harm in ad-
dition to correcting the violation; 23 5  (5) public access to
information is ensured by provisions directing an entity in certain
cases to enter a written agreement, which EPA will make publicly
available as a condition for mitigation of penalties; 23 6 EPA may also
require that the entity receiving a mitigation of penalties make a
description of its due diligence efforts available to the public; 237 (6)
instead of routinely requesting audits, EPA will request an audit
only if it has independent evidence of the existence of a viola-
tion;238 and (7) both the discovery and the disclosure of the viola-
tion must be voluntary. Disclosure of a violation by a
"whistleblower" employee, after notice of a citizen suit or legal com-
plaint by a third party would not be a voluntary disclosure, and EPA
would not reduce the violator's penalty.23 9
232. Id. at 66,711. EPA will bring criminal charges where the violation stems
from "a prevalent management philosophy or practice that concealed or con-
doned environmental violations" or "conscious involvement ... or willful blind-
ness" by high ranking employees. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 66,712. EPA's goal is to "level [the] playing field.., and [prevent]
violators [from] ... gain [ing] a competitive advantage over the companies that do
comply." Id. Several federal environmental laws authorize EPA to recover the eco-
nomic benefits of noncompliance in assessing an administrative penalty. See, e.g.,
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1986). EPA uses
a computer model to calculate any economic benefit a company may have reaped
by its delay in compliance (the "BEN model"). These benefits include the avoid-
ance of "monitoring and reporting expenses (including costs of sampling and lab-
oratory analysis, capital equipment improvements and repairs, . . . operation and
maintenance expenses (e.g., labor, power, chemicals)) .... " EPA Interim Clean
Water Act Settlement Penalty Policy, (March 1, 1995), 71 DAILY ENv'T REP., Apr.
13, 1995, at D-43.
235. EPA Policy on Prevention of Violations, supra note 9, at 66,709.
236. Id. For a discussion of state legislation concerning third party disclo-
sures, see supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
237. Id. The EPA included this provision in response to suggestions by envi-
ronmental organizations, and is designed to "allow the public to judge the ade-
quacy of compliance management systems, lead to enhanced compliance, and
foster greater public trust in the integrity of compliance management systems." Id.
238. Id. at 66,711.
239. Id. For a comprehensive analysis of the "whistleblower's protection," see
infra notes 331-71 and accompanying text.
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B. Drawbacks to EPA's Policy
EPA's policy does not reduce penalties that purport to recover
the economic benefits of noncompliance where the company's due
diligence revealed the violation. 240 There are two drawbacks to this
refusal to reduce penalties. First, it introduces an element of uncer-
tainty, so that the violator has no assurance that he will avoid a pen-
alty when self-reporting a violation. Second, the "economic benefit
of noncompliance" does not take into account the expenditures in-
curred in undertaking the audit or in implementing the compli-
ance management system. EPA should weigh these expenses
against any costs the company avoided by delaying compliance.
Without such considerations, EPA greatly reduces the incentive for
a regulated entity to incur self-reporting expenses. Although EPA
could simply add the element of the costs incurred in the audit to
its benefits of noncompliance (BEN) model, this would add a fur-
ther element of uncertainty. 241
On the other hand, where the violation was not discovered
through an audit or a compliance management system, the reduc-
tion of penalties is less significant. Under such circumstances, the
regulated entity has not undertaken any unusual expense and only
has the choice of whether to report the known violation. It has
little ground for complaint if the only benefit of self-reporting is a
seventy-five percent reduction in the gravity portion of a potential
penalty.
C. Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental
Projects Policy
EPA also encourages environmental audits through its new in-
terim policy, published in May 1995, on Supplemental Environmen-
tal Projects (SEPs).242 SEPs are environmentally beneficial projects
240. EPA Policy on Prevention of Violations, supra note 9, at 66,708, 66,612.
See also Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-29(7) (g), 49-17-43(g) (vii), 49-17-427(3) (g) (1995
& Supp. 1996). Mississippi has also reserved the authority of the state Commission
on Environmental Quality to assess penalties to recover the economic benefits of
noncompliance. Id.
241. The entire BEN model has been criticized as inaccurate because it is
based on unrealistic assumptions on tax benefits and the time value of money and
fails to take into account all relevant factors affecting the cost of compliance. See,
e.g., Robert H. Fuhrman, A Discussion of Technical Problems with EPA 's BEN Model, 1
THE ENvrL. LAw. 561, 579-582 (1995).
242. Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy, 60
Fed. Reg. 24,856 (1995). In order to facilitate compliance and regulate enforce-
ment, EPA enacted SEPs, thereby responding to complaints directed against the
awkward 1991 policy. Id.
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that a party agrees to perform in settlement of an EPA enforcement
action.2 43 The new policy includes guidelines denoting when an
audit will be accepted as an appropriate SEP.244 EPA accepts envi-
ronmental audits as appropriate SEPs for small businesses.245 How-
ever, because most large businesses perform audits as a matter of
course, EPA will not approve an environmental audit in place of a
SEP for larger companies.2 46 Violations uncovered in an environ-
mental audit undertaken as a SEP pursuant to a settlement with
EPA would not qualify for immunity as a "self-reported violation"
under most state statutes, because of the requirement in those stat-
utes that the audit be "voluntary."247
IV. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRIVILEGE
The EPA, in its recently published policy regarding environ-
mental auditing and self-disclosure of violations, articulated the
problems associated with an environmental audit privilege:
[Privileges can] shield evidence of violations . . . and un-
dermine the public's right to know, as well as to blanket
immunities for violations that reflect criminal misconduct,
health and the environment, allow noncomplying compa-
nies to gain an economic advantage over their competi-
tors, or reflect a repeated failure to comply with federal
law.2 48
There are three principal arguments against having a privilege
statute specifically designed to protect environmental audit reports.
First, the privilege promotes secrecy and places at a disadvantage
parties who have no other access to information essential to their
243. Id. The report defines and identifies the key characteristics of the SEP.
Id. at 24,857. Environmentally beneficial means "a SEP must improve, protect, or
reduce risks to public health, or the environment at large." Id. In the settlement
of an enforcement action is defined as "(1) EPA has the opportunity to help shape
the scope of the project before it is implemented; and (2) the project is not com-
menced until after the Agency has identified a violation." Id.
244. Id. at 24,858.
245. Id. at 24,858 n.9.
246. Id.
247. For further discussion of voluntariness of audits, see supra notes 125-27
and accompanying text.
248. EPA Policy on Prevention of Violations, supra note 9, at 66,709. The
Agency also noted numerous disincentives to creating a statutory privilege: (1)
privileges invite secrecy and create an atmosphere of distrust between regulators;
(2) interim policy and new policy suggest that privilege is not needed; (3) defend-
ants are encouraged to claim all material privileged; (4) privilege would promote
litigation and increase costs; and (5) public policy opposes privileges. Id. at
66,709-10.
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case. Although some statutes include exceptions to the privilege in
a civil, administrative or criminal enforcement action where the
government needs the information,249 there are usually no such ex-
ceptions for private parties or for citizens.250 Second, the privilege
may be unnecessary to promote audits by industry, as research
shows that more and more companies are performing audits re-
gardless of privilege.2 51 Third, the privilege and immunity statutes
can have the effect of removing the public from its role in policing
pollution. Finally, the privilege encourages audits at the expense of
private litigants, who should not bear this cost. Instead, other legis-
lative means, such as disclosure immunity, could better serve this
purpose without including a privilege that can adversely affect pri-
vate litigants. 252
A. Shifting the Burden of Promoting Environmental
Compliance to the Private Litigant
1. The Privilege May Result in the Incorrect Disposal of Litigation
State legislatures should hesitate before creating privileges for
the simple reason that secrecy interferes with the legal system's
search for truth. Regarding privileges, the Supreme Court has said
that "[w]hatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for
every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively con-
strued, for they are in derogation of the search for the truth."253
Dean Wigmore proposed that one of the four prerequisites to creat-
ing a new privilege should be that "[It] he injury that would inure to
the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater
249. See IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-3 (West 1996); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
224.01-040(4) (d) (4) to 224.01-040(5) (c) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996); OR. REV.
STAT. § 468.963(3) (c) (D) (Supp. 1995); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c) (iii)
(Michie Supp. 1996). For a further discussion of states' exemption to privilege,
see supra text accompanying notes 167-70.
250. Colorado has permitted an exception for cases in which the court deter-
mines there are "compelling circumstances" that favor admission of the material.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3) (c) (Supp. 1996).
251. For a discussion of audit practices by U.S. businesses, see supra notes 15-
18.
252. The state of Idaho has apparently taken this approach. Its privilege only
prevents state public officials, employees and environmental agencies from requir-
ing the disclosure of environmental audit reports. See IDAHO CODE § 9-804 (Supp.
1996). There is no express provision that would prevent discovery of an audit in
private litigation. Id. See also Katherine B. Crawford, Act Provides Limited Immunity
for Environmental Law Violations, ADvoc., Oct. 1995, at 23. For a further discussion
of case law governing privileges and prevention of violations, see EPA Policy on
Prevention of Violations, supra note 9, at 66,712.
253. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
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than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation."2 54
The environmental audit will certainly interfere with the "cor-
rect disposal of litigation." State legislatures, however, have for the
most part failed to consider the impact of the privilege on the pri-
vate litigant and to weigh it against the benefit of increasing audit-
ing. One commentator has noted the near total absence of
discussion concerning these impacts:
But where is there any meaningful examination of what
information will be denied to individuals harmed by envi-
ronmental activities if an audit privilege is adopted? For
example, perhaps we, as a society, might wish to keep evi-
dence of the source of groundwater contaminants out of
the hands of those suffering from cancer (a likely result in
the case of most environmental audit privilege statutes en-
acted so far), but wouldn't it be nice to know that such
consequences were actually considered by those enacting
the legislation?255
The privilege affects private litigants whereas the immunity af-
fects only the right of the state to collect civil or criminal penalties.
If the immunity provisions are justified as the most efficient method
of ensuring prompt environmental compliance, the privilege can-
not be justified on the same grounds. The immunity provisions are
successful because the state's goal is to maximize compliance, not
to collect penalties per se. If the "carrot" method promotes greater
compliance than the "stick" of prosecution, then immunity statutes
best serve the agency's purpose. In the context of private litigation,
however, the privilege statute benefits the violator by increasing the
difficulty an opponent faces in proving its case.
Two commentators have even suggested extending "immunity!'
statutes to cover private tort actions for violations uncovered in au-
dits.2 56 Fortunately, few would argue that it is appropriate to deny
254. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (emphasis in
original).
255. Ann C. Hurley, Environmental Audit Privileges: A Coverup, Not a Cure,
NAT'L ErvrL. ENFORCEMENTJ., Feb. 1995, at 17 (emphasis in original). The author
is the Environment Project Director and Chief Counsel for the National Associa-
tion of Attorneys General.
256. Hartman & King, supra note 75, at 25. Hartman and King find it ironic
that "no legislature has considered a bill that would grant immunity to private tort
actions." Id. They point out that the environmental audit privilege has origins in
the "self-critical analysis privilege" claimed often in medical malpractice cases. Id.
The authors ignore the fact that the "self-critical analysis privilege" is only a privi-
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injured persons access to the courts simply because the negligence
that caused them harm was also an illegal environmental violation.
Private parties who bring actions against a violator seek damages,
not "penalties." The private parties are not made whole by the vio-
lator's delayed compliance. Thus, while the privilege encourages
both audits and environmental compliance, it does so at the ex-
pense of private parties. Legislatures should weigh the effectiveness
of the privilege in promoting environmental audits against its ad-
verse effect on private litigants.
2. The Privilege will Increase Litigation Costs
The privilege statutes clearly have the potential to drive up the
cost of litigation for the private litigant. First, the privilege protects
any factual information developed or conclusions reached by the
auditor concerning potential violations of environmental law. The
statutes typically list information protected by the privilege. 257 EPA,
in enumerating its objections to the privilege statutes, cautioned
that the owner or operator could claim information such as health
studies or contaminated sediment data as privileged if developed as
part of an audit.2 58 Thus, if the opponent wanted the type of data
generated in the environmental audit, he would have to pay experts
to duplicate the tests already performed as part of the audit.
Two exceptions which are often used to prevent violators from
hiding violations that have previously caused injury fail to cover all
situations in which private parties suffer harm. While six states' stat-
utes make an exception for "public emergency or danger,"259 the
exception might not apply to parties whose injuries are not classi-
fied as dramatic or severe. For example, a plaintiff who has been
exposed to a high level of carcinogens may not exhibit a current
injury; therefore, a court may not grant the plaintiffs request for an
lege; in no jurisdiction does it provide immunity to doctors from malpractice ac-
tions. See id. Further, the authors fail to invoke any public policy that would be
furthered if injured parties were denied access to the courts to redress their inju-
ries. See id.
257. See, e.g., TEX. REv. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 4(c) (West Supp. 1997)
(specifying "information that is collected or developed for the primary purpose of
and in the course of an environmental audit, including: (1) interviews with cur-
rent or former employees; (2) field notes and records of observations; . . . (5)
drawings; (6) photographs; (7) laboratory analyses and other analytical data; ...
(9) maps, charts, graphs and surveys . . . " as being protected by the privilege).
258. EPA Policy on Prevention of Violations, supra note 9, at 66,710.
259. For a discussion of the "public emergency or danger" provision, see supra
notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
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audit under the "public emergency or danger" provisions. 26° A sim-
ilar exception that allows a party to discover audit documents upon
a showing of "compelling need" applies only to private litigants in
Colorado.2 61 Whether a court finds that an exception to the privi-
lege exists or not, the parties will certainly incur attorney's fees and
expend judicial resources litigating the issue.
B. Other Incentives to Perform Environmental Audits
1. The Threat of Enforcement
Both the increasing number of audits performed and the rarity
of their use in prosecutions may show that the privilege is unneces-
sary to promote auditing. Despite claims that lack of privilege de-
ters auditing, many businesses, particularly larger ones, are
conducting more audits.262 The Price Waterhouse survey indicated
that seventy-five percent of responding companies performed envi-
ronmental audits.26 3 Furthermore, enforcement authorities rarely
use audits to discover and prove environmental violations. Since
1986, EPA's own policy has limited the occasions where it will seek
discovery of audits. 26 Prosecution of audit-revealed, self-reported
violations rarely occurs either at the state or federal level.
26 5
260. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-126.5(3) (e) (Supp. 1996); IDAHO
CODE § 9-810 (Supp. 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (1) (d) (Supp. 1996); UTAH
R. EVID. 508(d)(4); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198(B) (Michie Supp. 1996); Wvo.
STAT. § 35-11-1105(c) (ii) (D) (Michie Supp. 1996).
261. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3)(c) (Supp. 1996).
262. For a further discussion of business auditing practices, see supra notes
15-18 and accompanying text.
263. See PRICE WATERHOUSE SURVEY, supra note 14. Also, the survey revealed
that those companies not regularly performing audits do not find it necessary, fur-
thermore, the degree of confidentiality afforded audit-related information was not
heavily factored into their decision to perform an audit. Id. at 40-41; See also EPA
Policy on Prevention of Violations, supra note 9 at 66,710.
264. EPA Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004
(1986). The policy states that EPA believes routine agency requests for audit re-
ports could inhibit auditing in the long run, decreasing both the quantity and
quality of audits conducted. Id, at 1. Instead, EPA would request audit reports as
necessary on a case-by-case basis. Id. The situations when EPA would request the
audit include: (1) when an audit is material to a criminal investigation; (2) when
the audit was conducted under a consent decree or settlement agreement; (3)
when a company's management practices were raised as a defense; or (4) when the
audit is needed to show state of mind or intent. Id.
265. David Ronald, The Case Against An Environmental Audit Privilege, NAT'L
ENvrL. ENFORCEMENTJ., Sept. 1994, at 3. The author is Assistant Attorney General
and Chief of the Environmental Crimes Unit for the Arizona Office of Attorney
General. An informal survey of state enforcement officials determined that audits
are rarely used in enforcement. Id. The author uncovered only one instance in
which state or federal authorities pursued civil or criminal penalties against an
entity that discovered a violation as a result of a voluntary self-audit and voluntarily
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Some opponents of the privilege fear that disclosure immunity
statutes remove the threat of prosecution even in situations where
such a threat is necessary to ensure compliance. 266 Others insist
that there is no need to offer a privilege to encourage businesses to
perform audits because it is already in the self-interest of businesses
to perform audits? 67 Companies face the threat of state enforce-
ment, federal "over-filing" or citizen suits if they fail to discover and
correct violations. Furthermore, operators in environmentally dan-
gerous businesses may have a common law obligation to perform
audits in order to prevent accidents. The New York Attorney Gen-
eral's Office has taken the position that environmental audits have
become a common business practice and are therefore part of a
"reasonable standard of care" for companies doing business in the
state.2 68 Therefore, a company that neglects to audit and subse-
quently is confronted with a serious accident could face charges of
reported it. Id. at 4. For a discussion of the Coors case, see supra note 13 and
accompanying text. See also In Re Harmon Electronics, Inc., No. RCRA-VII-91-H-
0037, 1994 WL 730509 at *1 (E.P.A.) (Dec. 12, 1994) (discussing prosecution of
company for environmental penalties that made "good faith efforts" to comply
with law). In Harmon Electronics, EPA "overfiled" a civil action under section
3008(a) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) against an elec-
tronics company that had already settled with the Missouri Department of Environ-
mental Protection. Id. However, the defendant neither discovered the violation
through an audit nor reported the violation to authorities. Id. Rather, upper man-
agement became aware of the violation without a formal audit and addressed the
problem internally. Id. The Missouri Department of Environmental Protection
discovered the violation in a routine inspection, notified EPA, and settled with the
defendant in a consent decree which assessed no penalty. EPA "overfiled," initially
seeking penalties of $2.7 million dollars. Id. Because there was no audit, Harmon
Electronics could not have avoided a penalty in any state by relying on an immu-
nity statute. Nevertheless, it could receive a seventy-five percent penalty reduction
under EPA's Policy on Prevention of Violations. See EPA Policy on Prevention of
Violations, supra note 9.
266. In a brief submitted to EPA in opposition to the proposed policy on
audits and self-disclosed violations, Stanford Lewis of the Good Neighbor Project
for Sustainable Industries described three categories of potential abuses of disclo-
sure immunity statutes: (1) the possibility that audits would be conducted to pre-
empt anticipated inspections; (2) disclosure will give businesses a competitive
advantage by extending the time to come into compliance than competitors; and
(3) falsifying the data of detection to make it appear the company acted in "good
faith" and took timely remedial action. Brief of SJ. Lewis at 5 EPA Office of Air
and Radiation Docket C-94-01, Environmental Auditing Policy Compliance, IV-D-
02, August 6, 1994.
267. Ronald, supra note 265, at 3.
268. See Companies That Fail to Audit May Face State Criminal Charges, Prosecutor
Says, Daily Env't Rep., Sept. 9, 1994, at AA, quoting James Sevinski, Chief of the
Environmental Protection Bureau of the New York Attorney General's Office
(warning attorneys in attendance at ABA annual environmental enforcement con-
ference that their clients may be subject to criminal liability if they do not incorpo-
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criminal negligence. 269 These factors alone should prove to be a
sufficient incentive for companies to conduct business in a safe and
legal manner.
In the past, EPA has opposed state privilege statutes on the
grounds that they will weaken state enforcement programs, impose
cost and delays in enforcement actions, and may increase EPA
"over-filing" of enforcement actions that would have been a state
responsibility had the privilege not been in effect.270 Because stat-
utes such as RCRA, CAA and CWA require that states have adequate
enforcement programs, 271 EPA may withdraw its approval of dele-
gated state environmental programs and in some cases has
threatened to do so.2 72 Several state attorneys general opposed to a
federal statutory privilege have argued that the use of a company's
self-audit in enforcement actions should be a matter of
prosecutorial discretion. 273 These state attorneys general feel the
privilege is particularly inappropriate in criminal actions, where
prosecutors may require audit documents in order to prove the de-
fendant acted knowingly.274
269. Id.
270. Restatement of Environmental Auditing Policies, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,455,
38,459 (1994). EPA urged states to hold off on passing audit privilege statutes
until EPA could fully consider the ramifications of such statutes. Id.
271. RCRA §3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1995); CAA § 502, 42 U.S.C.
§7661(a) (1995); CWA § 402(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1986).
272. Operating Permits Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 47,155 (1994) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R pt. 70) (proposed Sept. 14, 1994). EPA considered this issue in grant-
ing interim approval to both Oregon's and Colorado's CAA Title V permitting
programs. EPA noted that if, during permit implementation, EPA determined
that Oregon's environmental auditing statute interfered with the States' enforce-
ment responsibilities, it would view the privilege as grounds for withdrawing its
approval. Id. at 47,106. See also Operating Permits Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 4563,
4564 (1995). See Attorneys General Say EPA Should Offer Greater Flexibility on Environ-
mental Audits, ENV'. REP., Mar. 25, 1994, at 2009. In an effort to eliminate "overfil-
ing" in states that have enacted self-auditing and self-reporting immunity statutes,
the House Appropriations Subcommittee has responded with a proposal to cut
EPA's enforcement budget by $129.47 million (nearly forty percent of its budget)
in fiscal year 1996. Enforcement: Appropriations Panel Targets $129 million in "Low
Priority" EPA Enforcement Actions, DAILY ENV'T REP., July 12, 1995, at dl0.
273. Martha Kessler, Environmental Audits: Massachusetts Attorney General Urges
EPA to Oppose Audit Privilege Legislation, DAILY ENV'T. REP., Feb. 6, 1995, at A-8.
Massachusetts Attorney General Hershberger argued that openness will promote
compliance more readily than secrecy. Id.
274. Enforcement: California Prosecutors Urge EPA Not to Offer Environmental-Audit
Privilege, DAILY ENV'T. REP., Jan. 25, 1996, at A-5. Opponents of the privilege ar-
gued that "'self-criticism' privilege [is] inappropriate for environmental law en-
forcement." Id.
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2. Environmental Auditing Can Be Promoted Through
Other Means
State legislatures or environmental agencies could promote in-
creased self-discovery and correction of violations through means
that do not involve a privilege and which have corresponding ad-
verse effects on private parties. EPA's policy rewards auditing and
other due diligence efforts without a privilege and with no substan-
tial effects on private litigants. States should consider the approach
taken by New Jersey, which recently enacted a "grace period" for
minor violations that are promptly reported and corrected.2 75 The
New Jersey statute encourages diligent environmental self-review by
excluding any violation exceeding twelve months in duration.2 76
Alternatively, the states could take an approach similar to that of
Idaho and South Dakota, which have made the privilege effective
only against the state.277 The Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency, in cooperation with the Illinois Department of Commerce
and Community Affairs, has developed an "Environmental Amnesty
Program" that provides incentives similar to the immunity stat-
utes. 278 Illinois does have a privilege, but there is no reason why
states would have to enact a privilege or an immunity statute in or-
der to develop a similar amnesty program.
3. Incentives to Conform to International
Environmental Standards
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is in
the process of formulating new standards for environmental per-
formance, 79 including new standards for environmental audit-
ing.2 8 0 International trade can provide a significant incentive for
businesses to conform to the standards. 281 Interestingly, one of the
most controversial issues the environmental auditing subcommittee
275. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1D-125 to -131 (West Supp. 1996).
276. Id. § 13:1D-129(b)(4).
277. See IDAHO CODE § 9-804 (Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-40-35
(Michie Supp. 1996).
278. See ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE AMNESTY ANSWER:
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL AMNESTY PROGRAM, (February 1995); ILLINOIS ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SMALL BusiNEss GUIDE FOR GETTING A CLEAN BREAK,
(April 1995).
279. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International Or-
ganization for Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 479. Roht-Arriaza explores the role a "global system of private or-
dering" should have in protecting the environment. Id. at 481.
280. Id. at 507-508.
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faced concerned whether the standard should require the publica-
don of environmental auditing reports. 28 2 The Europeans on the
subcommittee generally favored the required public disclosure of
audit results, as is currently required by European standards.283
C. Remedying a Violation Is Not Equivalent to Compensating
for Damages to People, Private Property or
the Environment
State statute privilege provisions requiring the owner or opera-
tor to "remedy the violation" do not necessarily require that the
damage already caused by a violation be cleaned up or that its vic-
tims be compensated. The lack of mandatory compensation to peo-
ple for personal injury or property damage resulting from violations
is a significant shortcoming of the privilege. In contrast, EPA's Pol-
icy on Prevention of Violations makes it clear that both the viola-
tion and any resulting damages must be remedied before a violator
qualifies for mitigation of penalties.2 84
D. Adverse Effect on Public Right to Know
The privilege statutes may affect the public's ability to keep in-
formed regarding ongoing violations. Although the failure to
promptly initiate efforts to comply always waives the privilege, it
may take years for the violator to get the pollution control equip-
ment installed. In all environmental audit statutes except Minne-
sota's,2 85 specific information, including the identity of the violator,
global and regional trade agreements may explicitly recognize them; gov-
ernment regulations may refer to them for definition of terms; and gov-
ernment procurement rules may adopt them. Further, market pressures
from consumers, financiers, insurers and competitors may convert them
to prerequisites for companies wishing to do business in large markets.
Id.
282. Id. at 508. Europeans also favored third-party audits. Id. They felt that
outside arbiters were consistent with the OSO 9000 quality control certifications.
Id.
283. Id. The U.S., however, was concerned only about cost and the legal con-
sequences likely to occur in this country. Id.
284. EPA Policy on the Prevention of Violations, supra note 9, at 66,711. "The
regulated entity... [must] take[ ] appropriate measures as determined by EPA to
remedy any environmental or human harm due to the violation... Where appro-
priate, EPA may require that to satisfy [this condition to prevent recurrence], a
regulated entity must enter into a publicly available written agreement .... particu-
larly where remedial compliance measures are complex." Id.
285. 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168 § 11 (West). The state commissioner of
environmental protection will publish, on a quarterly basis, the names and loca-
tions of the facilities for which an environmental audit report and performance
schedule has been submitted and the proposed time period for compliance. Id.
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remains confidential.28 6 Therefore, the public may never know
about the threats posed as long as the violator is initiating efforts to
comply.
V. CONFuCT OF LAW IssuEs
One of the more provocative aspects of audit privilege legisla-
tion is the potential for conflicts of law. In general, the law of the
state where the facility is located would govern the confidentiality of
the audit.28 7 Nevertheless, a business wanting to ensure confidenti-
ality should not rely on this factor alone. The possibility that out-of-
state courts could require disclosure of the material is a great con-
cern to businesses that want to take advantage of privilege and im-
munity laws.
A. Potential Issues Involving Conflicts of Law
Potential problems arise wherever a state court can assert juris-
diction over a lawsuit involving an audited facility in another state.
For example, a tort plaintiff may reside in a state not recognizing an
audit privilege, even though his alleged injury came from a facility
located in a state recognizing the privilege. In the alternative, a
plaintiff might file suit in its own state of residence against a viola-
tor located upstream in a neighboring state, claiming that pollution
from the violator's facility flowed across state lines. The plaintiff
may choose to file suit in the defendant's state of incorporation,
which may not recognize the privilege. In each example, a defend-
ant which conducted an audit of a facility where the privilege is
recognized may find itself trying to persuade an out-of-state court to
recognize the privilege of a foreign jurisdiction.
Similar complications arise if a company does a comprehensive
audit of facilities in more than one state. If the audit includes a
facility in ajurisdiction that does not recognize a privilege, there is
the possibility that a court in that jurisdiction could order disclo-
sure of audit materials relating to all facilities. If there is a single
audit, the court may order it produced in its entirety, although a
court is more likely to allow redacted versions of the E.A.R to be
produced. If there are separate audits, the court might require dis-
closure only of the audits of the in-state facilities. However, the
286. Information disclosed to state authorities is exempt in most jurisdictions
from state freedom of information laws. For a further discussion see supra notes
211-22 and accompanying text.
287. For a discussion of conflicts of law issues in out-of-state situations, see
infra text accompanying notes 291-98.
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party opposing the privilege may argue that the audits of the out-of-
state facilities are relevant on theories that the audit reveals a com-
mon practice of the defendant.28a A plaintiff may want an out-of-
state audit to show that the company had reason to know of a viola-
tion. For example, if a 1995 audit shows that a certain practice is
illegal in Pennsylvania, the company is immediately on notice that a
similar practice in a Texas facility may also be illegal.2 89 If the com-
pany delays in investigating the practice in the Texas facility, but
then later claims a privilege and immunity, the party opponent may
assert that the privilege does not apply or is claimed for a fraudu-
lent purpose.290
Another potential conflict arises when communications relat-
ing to the audit take place outside the state where the facility is
located. For example, the auditor may interview a former plant
manager who has moved to another state. Such a communication
may not be privileged under the laws of the state where the man-
ager is located. Likewise, another potential issue is whether the
privilege can be lost for all purposes if an audit is revealed in an
out-of-state proceeding. Even if only the portions of the E.A.R. re-
lating to an out-of-state facility were produced in the prior proceed-
ing, there may be a question as to whether it could be admissible in
the in-state proceeding on a theory of waiver.
Another conflict arises where a party attempts discovery in one
state ("discovery state") for litigation pending in another state. For
example, if the manager of a plant in Texas (privilege) retires to
Florida (no privilege), a Florida court may face the issue of whether
to enforce a subpoena to take the manger's deposition in Florida
for purposes of audit-related litigation pending in Texas. Similarly,
a Texas court may need to decide whether to enforce a subpoena
for information regarding a Florida facility for litigation pending in
Florida.
288. Hartman & King, supra note 75, at 20. This is more often an issue in
prosecution than in private litigation, but is also likely to arise in a citizen suit. Id.
289. Naturally, the party asserting the privilege will not always be the defend-
ant in the lawsuits. In Reichhold Chemicals v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D.
Fla. 1994), the plaintiff was allowed to keep its audit documents confidential under
the "self-critical analysis" doctrine even though it had raised the environmental
issue itself by bringing a CERCLA contribution action. However, the plaintiff
chooses the forum; if the party asserting a privilege wants to keep the privilege, it
should sue in jurisdictions where the privilege is recognized. For an examination
of the "self-critical analysis privilege," see supra notes 27-44 and accompanying
text.
290. See discussion of fraudulent purpose exception, supra notes 183-87 and
accompanying text.
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B. Principles of Conflicts of Law
A state court will look at two or three basic considerations in
deciding whether to apply its own privilege law or the law of an-
other jurisdiction. First, it will consider which state has the most
significant contact with the litigation or cause of action. Second, it
will determine which state has the most significant relationship with
the communication. The court ruling on privilege may decide that
it is not the forum for the whole of the litigation, but is only the
"discovery state."
The "state with the most significant relationship to the commu-
nication" is usually the state where the communication took
place. 291 In the environmental audit context, this should be the
state in which the facility is located. Where the forum for the litiga-
tion is not the state with the "most significant relationship to the
communication," the Restatement of the Law (Second) describes
two basic rules for resolving conflicts between states concerning ap-
plicability of a privilege:
(1) Evidence that is not privileged under local law of the
state which has the most significant relationship with the
communication will be admitted, even though it would be
privileged under the local law of the forum, unless the ad-
mission of such evidence would be contrary to the strong
public policy of the forum.
(2) Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the
state which has the most significant relationship with the
communication but which is not privileged under the lo-
cal law of the forum will be admitted unless there is some
special reason why the forum policy favoring admission
should not be given effect.292
The rules set forth in the Restatement clearly favor admission
of the material. No state court, however, has been willing to recog-
nize a foreign state's privilege in a lawsuit pending in its own
forum. 293 This remains true even where the court recognizes that
291. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFucr OF LAWS § 139 cmt. e (1971).
There are a few exceptions to this rule arising primarily when there was a prior
relationship between the parties and the relationship was "centered." For exam-
ple, where a communication takes place between husband and wife who are tem-
porarily visiting another state, the state of marital residence would ordinarily have
the "most significant relationship to the communication." Id.
292. Id. § 139.
293. A few courts have recognized a foreign state's privilege in deciding
whether to enforce discovery in a suit pending in another state. For a discussion of
these issues, see infra notes 295-313 and accompanying text.
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the foreign state has a more significant relationship with the
communication.2 94
Despite this preference for admission of the material, a court
in ajurisdiction with no privilege should recognize a foreign state's
privilege if there is a "special reason" to do so.29 5 The court may
find that other factors would make it unfair to admit evidence de-
veloped by a. party with the expectation of confidentiality. A fair-
ness argument may be particularly persuasive where the foreign
state has both the most significant contact with the communication
and with the underlying transaction.2 96 Such a situation may arise
where a tort plaintiff sues the defendant in its state of incorporation
for damages for an injury allegedly caused by its facility in a state
recognizing the privilege. Although a court in the state of incorpo-
ration could assertjurisdiction over the case, it may find it appropri-
ate to apply the privilege laws of the state where the facility is
located.
Another "special reason" to recognize the privilege of the state
where the facility is located is that the privilege is part of that state's
system of environmental protection. The state in which the facility
is located has the responsibility to regulate the facility as well as an
interest in ensuring that the facility is in compliance with environ-
mental laws. Because that jurisdiction enacted the environmental
audit privilege to promote compliance, another jurisdiction's disre-
gard of this privilege would undermine the environmental protec-
tion scheme of the state regulating the facility.
Where the local law of the forum recognizes the privilege, but
the state in which the audited facility is located does not, there is
an exception to the general preference for disclosure where the
forum state has a "strong public policy" favoring confidentiality.297
294. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 416 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981), vacated, 432 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1982). The following facts supported
the Illinois court's findings that Wisconsin was the state with the most significant
relationship: Wisconsin company manufactured excavator; it collapsed and caused
injury in Illinois; and internal investigation was conducted in Wisconsin. Id. Ap-
plying the Restatement's rationale, the court found no "special reason" to apply
Wisconsin's law of privilege. Id. at 1094. Therefore, the forum's policy favoring
disclosure outweighed Wisconsin's policy favoring confidentiality. Id. at 1092-94.
295. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(2) (1971).
296. See Danklef v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., 429 A.2d 509 (Del. Super. Ct.
1981). A Delaware court refused to enforce a subpoena duces tecum which was
sought relative to a medical malpractice suit pending in Colorado because it found
that Delaware had more significant contacts with the underlying transaction. Id.
The Delaware court supported its decision by noting that the operation and the
communications took place in Delaware, and Colorado's jurisdiction was based
only on personal jurisdiction. Id. at 512.
297. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) Or CoNLIcr Or LAws § 139(1) (1971).
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Any state having a privilege statute may be likely to find such a
"strong public policy." This is particularly true in those states where
the environmental audit statute provides for fines and civil liability
for wrongful disclosure of the material.2 8 As a consequence, courts
in states recognizing the environmental audit privilege may not ad-
mit audit documents even where the state in which the facility is
located is found to have the "most significant relationship with the
communication" and does not have a privilege statute.
Alternatively, the forum may try to determine whether courts
in the state in which the facility is located would apply another priv-
ilege to protect the audit. Where the courts of that state have de-
clined to apply privileges such as the attorney-client, work product
or self-evaluative privilege to environmental audits,299 the forum
may decline to grant protection to an audit that would not be privi-
leged in the state in which it was performed.
To determine whether a special reason exists for recognizing a
foreign privilege, the comments accompanying the Restatement
enumerate several factors that a court will consider, including:
(1) the number and nature of the contacts that the state
of the forum has with the parties and with the transaction
involved;
(2) the relative materiality of the evidence sought to be
admitted;
(3) the kind of privilege involved; and
(4) fairness to the parties. 00
The first factor, applied to the environmental audit context, would
be where the facility is located and the damage occurred.301 For
example, suppose a toxic tort plaintiff who sustains an injury while
living next to a plant in Colorado, then subsequently moves to New
Mexico. A New Mexico court may find that it should recognize Col-
orado's privilege because both the communication and the tortious
action that forms the basis of the suit took place in Colorado. The
298. Colorado, Mississippi, Texas and Utah all impose some version of liabil-
ity for wrongful disclosures. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(5) (b) (Supp.
1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 57-39-23 (1972); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc §
6(d) (West Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7-104(2) (1996).
299. Courts in Ohio and NewJersey have considered this issue and refused to
apply the self-critical analysis privilege to environmental audits. See CPC Int'l Inc.
v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 620 A.2d 462, 468 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1992); State ex. rel. Celebrezze v. CECOS Int'l Inc., 583 N.E.2d 1118, 1119 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1990).
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second consideration, materiality of the evidence, would depend
on how directly the violation relates to the plaintiff s harm.302 For
example, if the audit reveals a violation, such as an unreported spill,
which caused plaintiff's harm and demonstrates negligence per se,
the court may find the evidence material. In contrast, an audit that
reveals only "paper violations" may have only a slight relationship to
the plaintiffs cause of action. Third, the court looks at the kind of
privilege involved to determine if it is well established and recog-
nized in many states.303 Applying this consideration, courts might
be reluctant to recognize a foreign state's environmental audit priv-
ilege, because only fourteen states have E.A.R. privileges and the
first statute only dates from 1993. The final consideration noted by
the Restatement, fairness to the parties, should include whether the
parties making the communication relied on its confidentiality.3
0 4
The owner or operator certainly relies on the privilege whenever an
audit is conducted in a state that recognizes the privilege. Another
example of reliance on the confidentiality of the communication
might be a former plant manager who speaks to an auditor con-
cerning a facility located in another state. Any one or more of
these factors may be sufficient to persuade a court in a state that
does not have a privilege law to protect an audit performed in a
state that does have a privilege.
Where a party pursues discovery in another state the inquiry is
complicated further by a third "variable," the law of the place of
taking the deposition. Some courts have held that where the dis-
covery takes place in a state other than that in which the underlying
proceeding is being conducted, the forum state should apply the
out-of-state rule. The Supreme Court of Mississippi recently consid-
ered this issue in Barnes v. Confidential Party.305 In that case, the
Mississippi court held that a nonparty deposition witness to a Geor-
gia divorce case could assert a privilege recognized in Georgia even
though Mississippi did not recognize the privilege.306 The court so
held even though the deposition was to be taken in Mississippi, the




305. 628 So.2d 283 (Miss. 1993).
306. Id. at 289. Georgia recognizes a witness's right to refuse to testify as to
any matter "which shall tend to bring infamy, disgrace, or public contempt upon
himself...." GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-27(a) (1995). In Barnes, the husband in a
Georgia divorce action sought to depose the movant on the movant's alleged rela-
tionship with the wife. Barnes, 628 So.2d at 285.
[Vol. VIII: p. 1
60
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss1/1
ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS
garding events that had occurred in Mississippi.30 7 Although there
are few cases on this precise issue, the Barnes court found a New
York case persuasive: "[w]hen an examination before trial is con-
ducted pursuant to a commission issued by a foreign court, logic
requires that all issues regarding the propriety of questions put to
the witness be referred to the trial court."308 The New York court
held that because the trial court would make the ultimate rulings
on the admissibility of evidence, the forum state's law should deter-
mine all discovery questions.30 9 It should be noted, however, in
Barnes the court found an additional rationale for applying Geor-
gia's privilege law: under Mississippi's own choice of law principles,
the forum state's law should apply to the proceeding.310
On the other hand, some states refuse to apply the forum
state's privilege law to discovery where the deposition state is also
the state with the most significant contact with the communication.
In.Danklefv. Wilmington Medical Center,3 1' a Delaware court refused
to enforce a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to a medical malprac-
tice case pending in Colorado. Because both the operation and the
communications took place in Delaware, the court found that Dela-
ware had the most significant relationship with the communication
and its law of privilege would control.3 1 2 Most significantly, the
court found no need to consider whether Colorado would recog-
nize the Delaware privilege. 3 13 Therefore, the Delaware court used
a much different analysis than used by the Mississippi and New York
courts in the cases discussed above.
C. Law Applied in Federal Court
Where the federal court exercises diversity jurisdiction over a
cause of action originating under state law, the court will use an
analysis similar to that used in the courts of that state. The federal
rules of evidence require federal courts sitting in diversity to deter-
307. Barnes, 628 So. 2d at 286.
308. Id. at 288 (quotingJarvis v. Jarvis, 533 N.Y.S. 2d 207, 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1988)).
309. Jarvis, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
310. Barnes, 628 So. 2d at 289. Mississippi applies a "center of gravity" test to
determine which state's substantive law will apply to a proceeding. Id. Based on
the facts before the court, a Mississippi court would apply Georgia law because the
"center of gravity" of the case is in Georgia. Id. The "center of gravity" test is used
to determine which state has the most substantial contacts with the parties or the
subject matter of the action. Id.
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mine privilege in accordance with state law,314 although this does
not necessarily answer the question of which state's law it will ap-
ply.315 Under the Erie v. Tompkins316 doctrine, state law governs all
substantive issues in a diversity action, including choice of law is-
sues.31 7 State created privileges are substantive law.3 18 A district
court exercising diversity jurisdiction will apply the privilege as it
would be applied by the courts of the state in which it sits. 3 1 9
Where federal court jurisdiction is based on a federal cause of
action, with pendant state claims, the federal law of privilege will
govern the whole case.3 20 Although a few federal district courts
have found environmental audits privileged based on the self-criti-
cal analysis or work product doctrines, federal courts do not uni-
formly find environmental audits to be privileged. Similarly, in
federal cases in which the citizen plaintiffs assert pendant state
claims, the federal privilege law governs the entire case.3 21 There-
fore, the entire issue turns on whether a citizen suit is an action
under state or federal law.
Is an action brought under a provision of a federal statute (e.g.,
the citizen suit provision of the underlying federal statute) but al-
leging violations of a state law (where the program has been dele-
gated) a state law question or a federal question case with pendant
state law claims? There is not an obvious answer to this question in
states where the permitting program has been delegated to the
state. It is at least arguable that if all the alleged violations are of
state law, these state claims provide the entire substance of the suit.
Some commentators have suggested that a federal environmental
audit statute would not resolve the conflicts of law issues presented
314. FED. R. EvID. 501.
315. See Independent Petrochem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 117 F.R.D.
292, 294-95 (D.D.C: 1987).
316. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
317. Id.; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
318. Samuelson v. Susan, 576 F.2d 546, 549 (3d Cir. 1978); Indep. Petrochem.
Corp., 117 F.R.D. at 294.
319. Samuelson, 576 F.2d at 549; Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v.
ABC Records, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 472, 474 (W.D. Tenn. 1979).
320. See Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462, 466 (11th Cir. 1992); Hancock v.
Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1992); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d
136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 671
F.2d 100, 104 (3rd Cir. 1982); Memorial Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 n.3
(7th Cir. 1981).
321. See Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d at 466; Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d at 1373;
Von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 141; Win. T. Thompson Co., 671 F.2d at 104; Shadur, 664 F.2d
at 1061 n.3.
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by the conflicting state privilege laws;32 2 however, if a citizen's suit
in a delegated state is based entirely on violations of state law, a
federal statute will not resolve this conflict. The statute would only
provide the law of privilege where the underlying suit is based on
federal, not state, law.
The conflicts of law issues related to the environmental audit
privilege have the potential to cause considerable expense and de-
lay in private litigation. These conflicts may be resolved if other
state legislatures embrace the privilege at the rate seen in 1995.
State courts may also resolve the conflicts by adopting the self-criti-
cal analysis privilege or extending it to environmental audits.
VI. ErIEcT ON EMPLOYEES OF REGULATED ENTITIES
A. Extent to Which Privilege and Immunity Statutes
Protect Employees
1. Will Employees of the Regulated Entity Be Immune
from Prosecution?
Because environmental prosecutions are often brought against
both a corporation and employees who may have been directly in-
volved with a violation, whether immunity extends to employees will
be an important issue. In the past, state and federal authorities
have brought civil, administrative and criminal actions against cer-
tain individual employees who were involved in environmental vio-
lations as well as against the corporate employer. These individuals
include employees who performed illegal acts, managers who di-
rected them to do so, 3 23 and even "responsible corporate officers"
who knew or should have known of the violation.3 24 When the vio-
lation is revealed in an audit, and reported to authorities, will these
individuals also be immune from prosecution? The existing stat-
utes do not explicitly address this issue. One can, however, arrive at
a possible solution by reading the privilege and immunity statutes
322. See, e.g., Environmental Audits: Patchwork of State Privilege Laws Illuminates
Need for Federal Policy, Daily Env't Rep., June 22, 1995, at D-22.
323. United States v. Ward, 676 F.2d 94, 95-96 (4th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1451 (11th Cir. 1988).
324. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-66 (3d Cir.
1984). The court found a mid-level manager criminally liable when the corpora-
don disposed of waste without a RCRA permit. Id. at 664. Although the RCRA
provisions under which the officer was convicted require scienter, the court found
such knowledge could be inferred by the fact that the manager should have known
a permit was required. Id. at 668-69. See generally Raymond Banoun and Harold
Damelin, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers and Employees for Environmental Of-
fenses C667 ALI-ABA 275, 280-87 (October 31, 1991) (explaining development and
limits of "Responsible Corporate Officer" doctrine).
1997]
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together and keeping in mind the purpose of the laws. Each immu-
nity statute requires the violation be "discovered" in an audit.
325
Therefore, any employee who knew his actions were illegal should
not escape prosecution.
What of the employee who did not know that his actions were
illegal? What of the corporate officer who was responsible, but una-
ware of a particular practice at his facility? A real-life example
should illustrate. In a Colorado facility, employees regularly using
small amounts of acetone to clean equipment, reported that it had
been dumping acetone in sanitary sewers.3 26 Afterwards, the em-
ployees dumped leftover amounts on the ground outside the ware-
house door.3 2 7 Management, however, assumed that the employees
used the acetone until the containers were empty.3 28 When an au-
dit revealed the practice, management ordered the practice discon-
tinued and disclosed the violation to the Colorado Department of
Public Health and Environment.32 9 The Department found that
the company had met all conditions under the statute for immunity
from prosecution. 330 In so holding, the court recognized the stat-
ute's goal of encouraging employee honesty and declined to inter-
pret the statute so narrowly that employees would be afraid to tell
the truth.
2. Privilege Is Held by Employer Only
The employee may not be aware that the privilege created by
the statutes belongs only to the owner and operator of the facility
and not to the employee. Thus, the owner or operator may waive
the privilege, and the employee's statements may be used against
him. Likewise, the employee may have the erroneous impression
that he will be immune from prosecution for violations he discloses
in an audit. None of the statutes provide any protection for the
employee from being mislead by his employer as to the existence of
a privilege or immunity. Ironically, laws hailed as a way to help
"innocent" industrial facilities identify violations may have the ef-
fect of subjecting to prosecution or disciplinary action workers who
were unaware that their work practices were illegal.
325. For a discussion of immunity for discovering audit violations, see supra
notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
326. Enforcement: Six Companies Disclose Violations under Colorado Audit Privilege
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B. "Whistleblower" Protection and the Privilege Laws
1. Overview of Protection
The federal environmental statutes include important provi-
sions designed to encourage employees to speak up about viola-
tions. The premise of whistleblower protection is that greater
public scrutiny of industry will enhance environmental protection.
Because outsiders are rarely aware of environmental violations, and
because enforcement agency resources for inspection and testing
are limited, employee whistleblowers are an important means of
protecting the environment and public health against serious viola-
tions. Therefore, federal law, as well as statutory and common law
in many states, protect employees who report violations from
employers who terminate or discriminate against an employee
whistleblower.
A variety of federal statutes and state common law doctrines
protect employees who "blow the whistle" on their employers by
reporting environmental violations. 331 There are two basic ratio-
nales for whistleblower protection. First, the laws protect employ-
ees from: unfair termination or disciplinary action; coerced
participation in criminal activity; and the danger caused by the un-
derlying violation. Second, such employee protection doctrines
promote compliance with the law by the employer.
In states where there is now a privilege, an employee who re-
ports an environmental violation may be reporting information that
the company was legally entitled to claim as confidential. Depend-
ing on the timing, an employee who speaks out may also be subject-
ing his employer to legal prosecution that it could have avoided
under the new immunity statutes. EPA has stated in its Policy on
Prevention of Violations that it will not consider violations reported
by an unauthorized employee (e.g., a whistleblower) to be a "self-
reported" violation eligible for penalty mitigation. 332 If an em-
ployer terminates an employee for revealing such information, does
the employee have a cause of action for wrongful termination?
a. Protection of Whistleblowers Under Federal Law
All the major federal environmental laws include "whis-
tleblower protection" provisions.3 33 These provisions make it illegal
331. For a further discussion of federal statutory whistleblower provisions, see
infra notes 333-39 and accompanying text.
332. EPA Policy on Prevention of Violations, supra note 9, at 66,709.
333. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(1988); Federal Water Pollution Control Act (CWA) § 507, 33 U.S.C. § 1367
19971
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to fire or discriminate against an employee because he has reported
a violation of the particular statute.3 34 An employee who has exper-
ienced such discrimination can file a complaint with the Depart-
ment of Labor.335 After an investigation, the Secretary of Labor
may order: (1) that the employer abate the discriminatory action;
(2) that the employee be reinstated with back pay; (3) that the em-
ployer pay compensatory damages; and (4) where appropriate, that
the employer pay exemplary damages.3 36
Courts have interpreted the federal whistleblower statutes ex-
pansively to provide a great deal of protection to employees. For
example, no employer can discriminate against an employee who
reports a violation to federal authorities even where the violator
and the government settle the matter prior to any formal enforce-
ment action. 337 Another case held that an employee was protected
by the whistleblower provision of the CWA even though his report
of illegal action complaint was made internally and not to outside
authorities.33 8
Now, in many states, there are two statutes that may come in
conflict with each other. First, the environmental law says no em-
ployer may fire an employee for cooperating with an investiga-
(1994); Public Health Service Act (PHSA) § 1450, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (1) (1994);
Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) § 7001, 42 U.S.C § 6971 (a) (1988); Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensations and Recovery Act (CERCLA) § 110,
42 U.S.C. § 9610 (1994).
334. See, e.g., TSCA § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a) (1994): "No employer may
discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with re-
spect to the employee's compensation . . .because the employee . . .has-(1)
commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause to be
commenced, a proceeding under this chapter; (2) testified or is about to testify in
any such proceeding; or (3) assisted or participated or is about to assist or partici-
pate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any other action to carry out the
purposes of this chapter." Id.
335. See, e.g., TSCA § 23(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b) (1994). The statute provides
that "[a]ny employer who believes that the employee has been discharged or
otherwise discriminated against by any person ... may... file... a complaint with
the Secretary of Labor." Id.
336. See TSCA § 23(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b) (2) (B) (1994); CWA § 507(b), 33
U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994); PHSA § 1450(I) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 200j-9i(2) (b) (ii) (1994);
SWDA §7001(b), 42 U.S.C. §6971(b) (1994); CERCLA § 110(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9610(b) (1994).
337. Neal v. Honeywell, 33 F.3d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 1994) (Where employer
immediately settled with Federal authorities after its employee reported its viola-
tion of False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C §§ 3729-31, employee was nonetheless protected
from retaliatory harassment and physical threats by employee protection portion
of Act).
338. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. United States Dep't of Labor, 992
F.2d 474, 478 (3d Cir. 1993) (whistleblower provisions of Clean Air Act, §507(a),
42 U.S.C. § 1367(a), protect employees who report violations internally).
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tion.3 39  Second, the environmental audit law prohibits the
employee from revealing certain information relevant to a
violation.
b. State Whistleblower Protection Statutes
The employee's remedy under federal law is not exclusive,
however, even where the violation that the employee reported was a
federal violation. Over half the states have enacted whistleblower
protection statutes that prevent employers from firing employees
for reporting illegal activity.3 40 Some of these statutes apply only to
public employees, while the rest cover both public and private em-
ployees.34' State law protects private employees who report a viola-
tion of any state or federal law or regulation to authorities in
California,342 Connecticut, 4 3 Hawaii,344 Michigan,34 5 Oregon 346
and Tennessee. 347 In Louisiana, state law protects any employee
who reports a violation of environmental laws either to a supervisor
339. See TSCA § 23(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b) (2) (B) (1994); CWA § 507(b), 33
U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994); PHSA § 1450(I) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 200j-9i(2) (b) (ii) (1994);
SWDA §7001(b), 42 U.S.C. §6971(b) (1994); CERCLA § 110(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9610(b) (1994).
340. A recent summary of state whistleblower statutes is provided in chart
form in Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle
to the Media, and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM.
Bus. L wJ. 151, appendix A (1994). This chart shows whether the statute applies
to private employees as well as public employees and whether to be protected
under the statute the employee must make the report of wrongdoing to a particu-
lar body. Id.
341. Statutes protecting private employees are in effect in many states. See
CAL. LA3. CODE § 1102.5 (West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (1987);
HAw. REv. STAT. § 378-62 (1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 395/1 (West 1993); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26
§ 833 (West 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.36 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 181.932 (West 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2 (Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:19-4 (West 1988); N.Y. LAB. LAw § 740 (McKinney 1988); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.550 (Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (1991). Statutes that protect
only public servants are effective in several other states. Because the environmen-
tal audit privilege and immunity statutes effectively apply only to private compa-
nies, these statutes will not be considered.
342. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5. No employee can be fired or discriminated
against for reporting any violation of state or federal law or regulation to a govern-
ment or law enforcement authority.
343. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m.
344. HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-62.
345. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 15.362.
346. OR. REv. STAT. § 659.550 (employee cannot be fired or discriminated
against for reporting criminal activity to authorities or cooperating in criminal in-
vestigation, nor for bringing civil action against employer or testifying in a civil
action against employer).
347. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 ("no employee can be terminated for refus-
ing to participate in, or remain silent about, illegal activities," which are defined as
67
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or public body.3 48 Three of the states with "whistleblower protec-
tion" statutes-Illinois, Minnesota and Oregon-have since en-
acted privilege statutes.349 Minnesota also offers immunity.350
Several other states with "whistleblower protection" statutes have
considered environmental audit privilege and immunity bills in the
past year.351
The state whistleblower statutes differ as to whether the report
of illegal activity must be internal or external. Some states require
that the employee's "whistleblowing" must be made to a public au-
thority in order to fall under the protection of the statute.3 52 In
contrast, others require that the employee must have made his
complaint of wrongdoing internally with the company before "go-
ing public."353 Finally, some jurisdictions do not specify to whom
any violation of state or federal law, civil or criminal law or any regulation designed
to protect public health, safety or welfare).
348. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997) No employer
can discriminate against any employee who:
(1) Discloses or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body
an activity, policy, practice of the employer, or another employer with
whom there is a business relationship, that the employee reasonably be-
lieves is in violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation.
(2) Provides information to, or testifies before any public body con-
ducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into any environmental vio-
lation by the employer, or another employer with whom there is a
business relationship, of any environmental law, rule, or regulation.
Id.
349. See 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/52.2 (West Supp. 1996); 1995 Min.
Sess. Law Serv. 168 (West); OR. Riv. STAT. § 468.963 (Supp. 1996).
350. 1995 Min. Sess. Law Serv. 168 (West).
351. For a discussion of states considering environmental audit privilege and
immunity bills, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
352. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(b) (West 1989): "No employer shall
retaliate against an employee for disclosing information to a government or law
enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the
information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or violation or noncom-
pliance with a state or federal regulation." Id. An employee's internal report to
his supervisor is insufficient to support a claim for wrongful discharge under this
statute. See American Computer Corp. v. Superior Court, 261 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1989). Interestingly, California's statute makes an exception to allow an em-
ployer to terminate an employee who reveals certain confidential information:
"[t] his section shall not apply to... actions against... employees who violate the
confidentiality of the lawyer-client privilege. . . the physician-patient privilege,...
or trade secret information." CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(c) (West 1989).
353. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAw § 740.2-740.3 (McKinney 1988). The statute pro-
vides in pertinent part:
An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action against an
employee because such employee .... discloses, or threatens to disclose
to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the
employer that is in violation of law, rule or regulation which violation
creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health
or safety; . . . [this section] shall not apply to an employee who makes
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the report should be made. The approach requiring the employee
to report the offense to authorities before he can invoke the
"whistleblower" protection statute offers some assurances that a ter-
minated employee will not raise a false claim that he was a
"whistleblower." On the other hand, where the employee must re-
port his concerns internally first, the employer has an opportunity
to correct the wrongdoing, or the employee's mistaken perception
of wrongdoing. With this approach, the employer can avoid gov-
ernment enforcement proceedings and negative media attention.
c. Whistleblower Protection Under State Common Law
Even where there is no state statute protecting whistleblowers,
there is often a recognized common law remedy for employees
fired for reporting illegal activities. Many states have developed
common law theories that limit the employer's right to terminate
an employee "at will" in circumstances that would violate public
policy. At least nine jurisdictions have recognized a cause of action
for retaliation by an employer for an employee who reports illegal
activity, either internally or externally. 354 This includes five states
who have adopted privilege statutes,3 55 two of which also have "dis-
closure immunity."
Many employers have unsuccessfully argued that the federal
environmental statute "occupied the field" of the area of regula-
tion, preempting the employee's wrongful termination cause of ac-
tion under state law.3 56 The Supreme Court rejected this argument
in English v. General Electric Company.357 Historically, many employ-
such disclosure to a public body unless the employee has brought the
activity, policy or practice ... to the attention of a supervisor of the em-
ployer and has afforded such employer a reasonable opportunity to cor-
rect such . . . practice.
Id.
354. See, e.g., Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250 (Ariz. 1986); Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark. 1988); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester
Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981); Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 687-90 (Kan.
1988); Brown v. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987);
Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 471 (Md. 1981); Wiltsie v. Baby
Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev. 1989); Gutierrez v. Sundancer Indian Jew-
elry, Inc., 868 P.2d 1266, 1272 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); McQuary v. Bel Air Convales-
cent Home, 684 P.2d 21, 23 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
355. For a complete discussion of these and other states which have adopted
privilege statutes, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
356. See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 80 (1990); Willy v.
Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1988); Garg v. Narron, 710 F. Supp.
1116, 1118 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (employee of nuclear power plant discharged for re-
porting violations of engineering standards was not limited to pursuing administra-
tive remedy under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (b)).
357. 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
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ees who find themselves terminated for whistleblowing prefer to
waive their protection under federal law and proceed under state
common law theories for wrongful termination.
One intended effect of the environmental audit privilege laws
is that employees, knowing their communications are privileged,
will be more honest with the auditor about violations taking
place.3 58 States designed the laws granting immunity for self-re-
ported violations in order to encourage employers to discover viola-
tions before the authorities do. Therefore, an employer should
reward, rather than punish, the employee who reports violations
internally. Ideally, giving the employer the opportunity to report
and correct the violation without the risk of penalty will reduce any
incentive the employer has to fire the employee for "internal"
whistleblowing.
2. How the Privilege Statutes May Affect Whistleblowers
The new audit secrecy laws may affect whistleblowers in a vari-
ety of ways. In some cases revealing privileged material may be ille-
gal; whistleblowers may lose their protection in states where the
remedy is judge-made law. This could not only subject employees
to civil or criminal penalties but could also provide a legitimate ba-
sis for firing an employee. Further, ambiguity in the law may make
it difficult for an employee to know when he should "blow the
whistle."
a. Possible Loss of State Common Law Protection
In some situations, employee whistleblowers may lose the pro-
tection of state common law in those jurisdictions where there is a
statutory E.A.R. privilege. There is a potential conflict between the
right of an employee to go public with information concerning vio-
lations and the employer's right to keep the information secret,
particularly where the employee gained knowledge of the violation
through an audit. The new state statute would override any con-
flicting judge-made law.
Where employees become aware of the violation solely
through the audit, the privilege always applies. They cannot be
forced to reveal the information in court. However, if an employee
voluntarily chooses to "go public" with that same information, the
privilege statute is violated. In this situation, the employer may
have grounds to discharge the employee. The employer can now
358. See, e.g., Senate bill 580, supra note 8 (comments included in letters to
Sen. Hatfield in support of proposed legislation).
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say the employee committed an illegal act against the employer's
interest.
At least eight states have recognized a common law action for
retaliatory discharge but have no whistleblower statute.3 59 Four of
those states have passed E.A.R. privilege laws, and more have bills
under consideration by the legislature. 36° Where state common law
protections are lost, the employee who "blows the whistle" should
be able to "fall back on" the protections of the underlying federal
environmental statute.
b. Reporting the Information May Subject the Employee to
Civil Liability or to Criminal Sanction
Several privilege statutes provide sanctions for unauthorized
disclosures of privileged information.361 These often apply only to
parties who are under a court order restricting dissemination of the
audit report. However, some apply to any party, including an em-
ployee. Utah's statute provides particularly harsh sanctions which
apply to anyone who "willfully" divulges privileged information. 362
That person can be guilty of a class B misdemeanor, subject to a
civil penalty of up to $10,000, and liable for all damages proxi-
mately caused by disclosure of the information.363 Even if the em-
ployee's job is secured by a whistleblower protection statute, these
penalties may be sufficient to encourage him to keep silent about
his employer's environmental violations. However, if an employee
goes public with violations he knows from experience, the employer
has no ground for saying the employee violated privileged informa-
tion. The information is not subject to the privilege, and therefore,
the employer should not be able to fire the employee for reporting
the violation to authorities or for going public.
359. Arkansas, Arizona, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland and New Mex-
ico. For a further discussion of whistleblower protection under state common law,
see supra notes 355-58.
360. Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas and Kentucky already have environmental au-
dit privilege legislation. Maryland and Arizona are among those who have recently
considered such legislation. For a list of the states considering environmental au-
dit privilege legislation, see supra note 7.
361. For a discussion of sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of privileged
information, see supra notes 171-82 and accompanying text.
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c. An Employee May Need Privileged Material to Prove His
Case for Wrongful Termination
The employee may need the audit for a wrongful termination
case in two situations. First, if the employee is fired in retaliation
for going public, he would want to use the audit to show he was not
spreading lies about the company. Second, an employee may need
the audit to prove that he made statements to the auditor and his
employer fired him in retaliation. Where corporate officers may
not have been aware of the violation prior to the audit, a low-level
employee's supervisor may have been aware of the problem and
ignored it. In that situation, if an employee is honest with the audi-
tor, his immediate supervisor may retaliate against him.36 The em-
ployer should not be able to take any retaliatory action against the
employee for revealing problems to the auditor because it removes
the purpose of the environmental audit privilege statute-to let the
employer know where it has environmental compliance problems.
Therefore, if an employee charges that he was fired for revealing
such information, he would need the audit to prove motive for the
discharge. However, Colorado is the only state that has an excep-
tion to the privilege that may apply in this situation-where the
court finds "compelling circumstances." 365
d. Ambiguity in the Laws
Environmental audit legislation contains several ambiguities
that confuse matters for the employee considering "going public"
with information concerning environmental violations at work.
One problem is the conditional nature of the privilege. Unlike
other privileges, in most states the privilege applies only where the
violator takes steps to correct the problem.366 As a result, the em-
364. See, e.g., Neal v. Honeywell, 33 F.3d 860, 861 (7th Cir. 1994). The court
summarized the facts of the case, involving a plaintiff who had discovered that co-
workers were falsifying ammunition test data at the plant where she worked:
She told Honeywell's legal counsel, who immediately notified the army
and commenced an investigation. Senior managers concluded that
Neal's allegations were correct; . . . Honeywell agreed to a settlement
worth approximately $2.5 million . . . Neal's supervisors . . . took um-
brage at her honesty, which they believed jeopardized Honeywell's con-
tract and thus theirjobs. Neal alleges that these supervisors harassed her
and threatened her with physical harm. She took this as an instruction to
vamoose, and she quit.
Id. at 861.
365. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3)(c) (Supp. 1996).
366. For a discussion of corrective measures, see supra notes 115-24 and ac-
companying text.
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ployee may be unaware that a privilege applies because manage-
ment has taken steps to remedy the problem.3 67
In most states, the employer must "initiate appropriate efforts
to achieve compliance with environmental law within a reasonable
amount of time after the noncompliance was discovered."3 68 An
employee may be in no position to determine whether the privilege
properly applies. The employee may not know what if anything is
being done to correct the problem. If the employee reports a viola-
tion, and there is an investigation by authorities, is the employee
estopped from contesting the court's determination in the prosecu-
tion that the document is privileged? What if the employee has
complained about the violation before?
If the employee goes public with what he knows from personal
experience, there should be no conflict with the privilege law. Only
information the employee knows through the audit should be cov-
ered by the privilege; but the statutes are not clear on this point.
Only the Texas statute clearly states that the privilege does not pre-
vent the employee from reporting what he has seen through his
own eyes.3
6 9
If the employee does lose his job for reporting information he
knows from personal experience, should he be able to use the audit
to prove that he was not lying? Colorado's exception to the privi-
lege in "compelling circumstances" is the only exception that may
apply to this situation.3 70 As long as the employer is correcting the
violations revealed in the audit, there is no exception in any of the
other statutes that would let an employee use the audit as evidence
in a wrongful termination suit.3 71 The environmental audit statutes
should be designed to supplement, not supplant, existing environ-
mental, health and safety protections. In order to ensure that em-
ployees still feel free to speak up about environmental violations,
the statutes should include provisions protecting their speech and
their jobs.
367. Another ambiguity is the definition of what constitutes an "audit" and
when one is taking place. Should the privilege only apply to those audits which
comply with ISO standards, or will a more freewheeling definition take place?
368. For a discussion of statutes dealing with initiation of efforts, see supra
notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
369. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc § 5(d) (West Supp. 1997).
370. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3) (c).
371. Of course, since Idaho's privilege operates only as against the govern-
ment, the employee would not be prevented from obtaining an audit through dis-
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VII. CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article is to suggest a balance between maxi-
mizing environmental safety and protecting the rights of private in-
dividuals in environmental litigation. As shown by the EPA's new
Policy on the Prevention of Violations, this can be done administra-
tively as well as legislatively.372
The economic interests of the regulated community figure into
this equation only to the extent that making it economically advan-
tageous for the community to perform audits promotes environ-
mental safety. Therefore, the courts should interpret the existing
statutes in a manner that places the highest interest on environ-
mental protection, with the economic interests of the litigants a sec-
ondary consideration.
Legislatures should enact statutes that promote early detection
and self-reporting, but do not disadvantage the private litigant. In
the future, the states can achieve these goals while still protecting
the rights of private litigants and without removing the public's
voice in environmental protection. The EPA's policy offers an alter-
native approach that balances the interests of the public and the
regulated communities.3 73 State legislatures should also consider
Idaho's solution, where the privilege operates only against the state
government.3 74 This alternative would not affect private parties
while still providing incentives to audit.3 75
Granting the regulated community a chance to avoid penalties
for self-reported violations should be a highly effective means to
promote auditing.3 76 Providing immunity for self-reported and cor-
rected violations discovered in an audit that did not cause damages
off-site is equally effective. To encourage the entity to undertake
the expense of the audit or implement an environmental manage-
ment system, the statute should eliminate any penalty and do away
with the "economic benefits of noncompliance," if discovered
through those methods.3 77 State statutes or environmental agen-
cies should include immunity for violations discovered through due
diligence, as does EPA's policy. For violations not discovered in
that manner, the economic benefit of noncompliance should still
372. EPA Policy on Prevention of Violations, supra note 9 at 66,706.
373. Id.
374. IDAHO CODE § 9-804 (Supp. 1996).
375. Id.
376. See PRIcE WATERHOUSE, supra note 14, at 43-44 (discussing factors that
would encourage companies to perform more audits).
377. Id.
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be recoverable because the regulated entity did not undertake any
special expense.
One area where the statutes could be improved is the way in
which they address violations causing damages off-site. Some stat-
utes exempt from immunity violations causing off-site damages. 378
No statute has an exemption to the privilege where the audit
reveals damages off-site. The state statutes are emphasizing the
wrong things if they want to protect people and the environment.
If the violation did cause damages off-site, the violator should have
to remediate before the state considers the matter settled. There
should be an exception to the privilege as against any property
owner whose property may have been damaged by a violation. The
statute could possibly provide some alternative dispute resolution
for adjacent property owners to recover damages. For example,
once the violator has corrected the violation, remedied the dam-
ages and settled with its affected neighbors, it would be immune
from any prosecution. This solution would emphasize cleanup and
compensation, as opposed to penalties.
Citizens should have the right to intervene in the state's ap-
proval of the method and timetable for correction of the viola-
tions.379 The statutes or administrative policy should set out a
simple administrative procedure through which the public could
comment. Such a procedure may complicate the matters at the
outset, but could avoid citizen suits in the future. The public
should have the right to intervene if there are damages to public
property off-site. Concerned citizens should also be able to ques-
tion whether the violator is eligible for immunity from prosecution.
For example, the public should be able to argue that the regulated
entity knew of the violation prior to the audit.
One disturbing aspect of the privilege statutes is the possibility
that persons who reveal facts because they are concerned about the
dangers presented by violations could face unreasonable punish-
ment. Damages for revealing privileged information should only
apply to a person under a court order to keep the information con-
fidential. These damages should not apply to anyone who has per-
sonal knowledge of the facts concerning a violation. Persons such
as employees who are trying to keep the community informed of
dangers should not be subject to damages if they reveal information
378. For a further discussion of off-site damages, see supra notes 71-72 and
accompanying text.
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relevant to a violation.38 0 Instead, the holder of the privilege
should only have a cause of action when there has been a knowing
and therefore bad faith communication of an E.A.R. marked
"privileged."
Furthermore, the statutes should provide some guidance on
how to measure the damages for wrongful disclosure. The plaintiff
in a suit for wrongful disclosure should not be able to claim that his
damages are measured by the damages recovered against him in a
toxic tort or penalties recovered in a citizen suit. The states should
ensure that their statutes reward companies that make environmen-
tal compliance a priority. The regulated community must keep it-
self under constant scrutiny to prevent violations. States should
encourage this by foregoing penalties when the companies volunta-
rily disclose violations. An environmental audit privilege, however,
encourages secrecy and is a step in the wrong direction.
380. For a further discussion of whistleblower statutes and application to envi-
ronmental audits, see supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
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